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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The first essay provides a theoretical framework that informs the ongoing 
debate regarding the effect of conservation easement subsidies on local property 
tax revenue.  Supporters claim that conservation easements increase property tax 
revenue by providing environmental amenities that increase the value of adjacent 
properties.  Critics argue that they decrease property tax revenue by lowering land 
values and shrinking the tax base.  In instances when local property tax revenue 
decline due to the income tax deductibility of conservation easements, the decline 
is larger when the demand for land is more elastic, the proportion of non-
agricultural land in the county is larger, the agricultural tax benefit is larger, and 
there is less Ricardian rent on agricultural land. 
The second essay examines the role of political parties in affecting 
presidential control and congressional oversight of antitrust enforcement.  The 
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust is a presidential appointee who carries 
out the administration’s desired level of antitrust enforcement.  Congressional 
legislators have oversight and appropriations powers over the Antitrust Division.  
I assume that Democratic and Republican legislators have different preferences 
about the proper level of appropriations for the Antitrust Division.  In spite of 
these presidential party control and congressional oversight relationships, I do not 
find any political effect on the number of antitrust cases filed from 1903 to 2005.  
My result suggests that Division bureaucrats have wide discretion in case 
  iv 
selection and are independent of the influence of the White House and the 
Congress. 
The third essay studies the effect of a change in the sex ratio of males to 
females on the relative price of human sexual relations.  The illegitimate birth rate 
is used as an instrument for the price of sexual relations.  The reduction in the 
number of available sex partners for women during World War II decreased the 
price that remaining men had to pay for sex.  One result of this lower price is an 
increase in the number of illegitimate children born during the war.  The male 
scarcity also resulted in females marrying less suitable males who are different 
from their wives in terms of age, educational attainment, and real income. 
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PREFACE 
 
 
The three essays in my dissertation encompass topics in public finance, 
environmental economics, industrial organization, antitrust regulation, public 
choice, and applied econometrics.  In the first essay of my dissertation, mentored 
by Professor Walter N. Thurman of North Carolina State University, I model the 
effect of conservation easement subsidies on local property tax revenues.  I 
assume two sectors for the land market within a county: agriculture and non-
agriculture.  In this essay, I examine easement contracts that prohibit the 
development of agricultural land.  In return for preserving their agricultural land 
from future development, landowners receive a tax credit for donating the value 
of the conservation easement to a qualifying, tax-exempt land trust.  The value of 
the conservation easement is the difference between the agricultural use value of a 
parcel of farmland and the market value if the parcel is sold for development.  
The income tax deductibility of conservation easement donations acts as a 
subsidy that increases the demand for agricultural land.  Thus, the inframarginal 
parcel of land located at the rural-urban fringe sells for a higher price but the 
change in the proportion of agricultural land relative to non-agricultural land may 
adversely affect the local property tax revenue.  The result predicted by my model 
depends on the elasticity of land in both sectors, the proportion of non-agricultural 
land in the county, the agricultural tax benefit, and the existence of Ricardian rent 
or a cost advantage to farming closer to the city. 
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In the second essay of my dissertation, I study the role of political party 
affiliation in explaining antitrust enforcement at the Department of Justice’s 
Antitrust Division.  My model relies on modern public choice theory’s finding of 
political self-interest.  I assume that the demanders of antitrust cases are 
Congressional politicians who appropriate budgets to pay for a certain level of 
cases.  These politicians attach some value to antitrust cases because their main 
constituents, consumers and producers, prefer lower prices and higher profits in 
the market.  Antitrust cases are a source of wealth transfers from producers to 
consumers, whereas other types of regulation, such as price-protection, entry 
limits, and licensing requirements are a way of cushioning the producers’ falling 
profits during an economic downturn. I assume the suppliers of antitrust cases are 
Division bureaucrats who face an increasing marginal cost of litigating additional 
cases.  Putting the demand and supply curves together results in an equilibrium 
price-quantity pair that is observed each year.  The price is the Division’s 
appropriated budget and the quantity is the number of cases filed. 
I obtain data from 1903 to 2005 on the number of cases filed, the 
Division’s budget, the size of the economy, and the political party in power in the 
White House, the Senate and the House of Representatives, to explain the pattern 
of antitrust filings over the time period.  In an alternative estimation, I take into 
account the sequential decisions involved in the budget appropriations and the 
Division’s case selection.  First, I estimate the effect of Congressional political 
party majorities on the Division’s budget.  Then, I estimate the effect of 
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presidential party affiliation on the number of cases pursued by the Division 
subject to the given budget constraint. 
 The third essay of my dissertation is co-authored with Professors Robert 
E. McCormick of Clemson University and Mason S. Gerety of Northern Arizona 
University.  We utilize a demand and supply model of matching mates that results 
in an equilibrium relative price of sexual relations.  Men are net demanders of sex, 
while women are net suppliers of sex because they face an expected cost of 
pregnancy.  The relative price of sex paid by men to women includes marriage 
and financial support for any children that may ensue from a sex act.  During 
World War II, however, the exodus of males to fight overseas resulted in a sharp 
decrease of the sex ratio.  Competition between females for the shrinking number 
of males decreased the relative price of sex that the remaining males had to pay.  
Thus, males are less regularly required to make a long-term commitment of 
marriage in order to enjoy regular sexual relations.  Our model predicts that the 
decrease in the sex ratio of males to females during the war results is an increase 
in illegitimate births during that time period.  We obtain data on each state’s sex 
ratio, illegitimate birth rate, income per capita, median years of schooling, 
population density, and church membership in order to test our model’s 
prediction. 
 Another implication of the model is the male-female difference in age, 
education, and income for couples that married during the war.  Most of the 
remaining men that did not get sent to war were either too old or too young to 
serve in the Armed Forces, had an employment exemption, or were rejected as 
  4 
unfit for military service.  Therefore, women that got married during this period 
of male scarcity may have matched with men who are less desirable in terms of 
their age, previous marital status, educational attainment, and real income.  We 
obtain data on 9,969 couples who married during 1936 to 1950 in order to test the 
validity of this corollary. 
 
1 I gratefully acknowledge the generous Graduate Fellowship from the Property and Environment
Research Center (PERC) in Bozeman, Montana.  I am indebted to Wally Thurman for his
excellent mentorship on this project.  I thank Dan Benjamin, John Conlon, Bill Dougan, Matt
Lindsay, Mike Maloney, Bobby McCormick, Bill Shughart, Chuck Thomas, Bob Tollison, and
seminar participants at PERC, the University of Mississippi, and Clemson University for helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this paper.  The usual caveat applies.
2 More than nine million acres of U.S. land are now under conservation easements, according to
statistics from American Farmland Trust, Land Trust Alliance, The Nature Conservancy, and
The Trust for Public Land (Taylor 2004). Conservation easements protect 0.47 percent of the
approximately 1.9 billion acres of land in the lower 48 states (Wuerthner 2002).  See Parker
(2002) for a discussion on the cost-effectiveness of conservation easements versus fee-simple
ownership of land for conservation purposes.
3 To qualify for a tax deduction, the conservation easement donation must be considered a
charitable gift by the Internal Revenue Service.  The donation must be made to an IRS-qualified,
tax-exempt organization, such as a land trust or governmental agency.
4 I use the terms conservation easement subsidy and income tax deductibility of conservation
easements interchangeably, even though the latter term is more precise but unwieldy.
TRUSTS AND TAXES: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS ON LOCAL PROPERTY TAX REVENUES1
I. Introduction
Conservation easements are an increasingly popular and cost-effective tool
for encouraging  the conservation of private land.2  Easement contracts restrict
development on land used for agriculture, forestry, wildlife habitat, scenic views,
watershed protection, historic sites, recreation, and education (Horwitz 2005). 
Landowners who donate conservation easements receive tax incentives in the form
of charitable contribution deductions that lower their federal and state income tax
bills.3  This income tax deduction works as a subsidy for conservation easements.4 
The debate regarding the effect of conservation easements on local
property tax revenues remains unsettled.  Supporters claim that easements increase
5 See Appendix I for the capitalization of environmental amenity values into the demand for non-
agricultural land.
6
property tax revenues by providing environmental amenities that increase the value
of adjacent properties.  Critics claim that easements decrease property tax
revenues by lowering land values and shrinking the tax base by reducing the
amount of land available for urban development.  Both arguments have empirical
support, so in this paper I model the market for land in a county in order to predict
the effect of conservation easement subsidies on local property tax revenues.
Evidence supporting easements’ revenue increasing effects shows that
preserved agricultural open spaces can increase the value of nearby land parcels
(Geoghegan, Lynch, and Bucholtz 2003; Irwin and Bockstael 2001).  Geoghegan’s
(2002) hedonic model estimates that permanent open space triples the value of
adjacent residential land in Howard County, Maryland, compared to similar
developable open space.  According to Cheshire and Sheppard (2003, 147), “Open
space is an alternative use that is valued by nearby households.  It may be available
both in the form of a public good that is accessible to local households and in the
form of private use (by other consumers or producers) that provides external
benefits in the form of visual amenity or spatial separation from noxious uses.” 
Thus, an agricultural conservation easement’s environmental amenity value is
capitalized into the price of nearby non-agricultural land.  Clearly, the higher
market value of non-agricultural land increases local property tax revenue.5  The
current paper does not rely on the environmental amenity value of conservation
easements to increase local property tax revenues.  The exclusion of environmental
6 Aside from concerns about local property tax revenue, policymakers face other problems
stemming from conservation easements, such as reduced state income tax revenues, fraudulent
easements, and inflated appraisals (Phillips 2005).
7
amenity value from the model strengthens my findings because its inclusion is
likely to result in a positive tax effect from conservation easement subsidies.  
Nevertheless, policymakers, tax administrators, and academic researchers
have criticized the negative tax effects of conservation easement subsidies.6  King
and Anderson (2004) cite recent fiscal problems in the lower Hudson Valley, New
York as the result of conservation easements eroding the tax base.  In a popular
press article, Pesch (2005) claims, “Lower property values can result in a decrease
in property tax revenue or a shift of the burden onto other taxpayers, possibly
decreasing the money available for schools and local government infrastructure.” 
Pesch’s article reviews research findings by agricultural economist Steven Taff
(2004) who concludes that “conservation contracts significantly and negatively
influence [per-acre] sales price” in a sample of 190 recent sales of Minnesota
agricultural land. 
The first criticism leveled against conservation easements is that they lower
land values.  Conventional wisdom holds that a conservation easement decreases,
by the development premium, the market value of the land it encumbers.  For
instance, a parcel of farmland located on the urban fringe can command a market
price of $1,000,000 if it is sold for development, but it is currently appraised at its
agricultural use value of $700,000.  Thus, the conservation easement or
development premium is valued at $300,000.  If the development rights to this
parcel are donated to a qualifying tax-exempt organization, such as a land trust,
8the landowner is entitled to a charitable contribution deduction for $300,000 on
her federal income tax return.  Federal tax law allows a maximum deduction of 30
percent of an individual’s Adjusted Gross Income (AGI), carried forward for up to
six years or until the value of the charitable contribution is used up, which ever
occurs first.  Alternatively, a landowner can elect to use a property’s “basis”
(original purchase price or inherited value) and take an annual deduction of 50
percent of her AGI for six years or until the value of the charitable contribution is
used up (Montana Land Reliance; Parker 2004).
Nickerson and Lynch (2001) find that farmland encumbered by agricultural
easements sells for lower prices than unencumbered farmland.  Critics, however,
fail to acknowledge that conservation easements may increase the market value of
surrounding land because of environmental amenities (e.g., scenic views, improved
wildlife habitat, better air and water quality, less erosion, and less traffic
congestion) that accrue from the easement.  There are fewer acres of developable
land after conservation easements are put into place, but the increased market
values and property tax revenues from surrounding lands may be greater than the
“loss” in future property tax revenues from the restriction on development of
easement lands.
The second criticism brought against conservation easements is that they
shrink the local government’s tax base by taking potentially developable land out
of the real estate market.  Thus, it is said, local governments must raise local
property tax rates to finance existing levels of local public services provision.  This
partial equilibrium analysis of developable land, however, does not consider the
7 In addition, expenditures decrease due to reduced provision of public services such as fire and
police protection to the easement land (Feitshans and Renkow 2002, p. 3).  Nor do local school
districts need to support an inflow of children into the area, because the easements take
potentially developable agricultural land out of the real estate market.
8 My model is due in part to Friedman (1990).
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equilibrium effects for all parcels of land, both urban and rural.  Encouraging
conservation easements on agricultural land results in fewer acres allocated to non-
agricultural uses, but the price of these non-agricultural lands is higher.  Higher
prices on the remaining parcels of land imply that local governments collect greater
amounts of local property tax revenues on at least some parcels.7
Confusion over the public finance implications of conservation easements
suggests that there is scope for further inquiry into this issue.  To that end, I
propose a two-sector model of land taxation to analyze the change in local
property tax revenues stemming from the income tax deductibility of conservation
easement donations.  I show conditions under which conservation easement
subsidies change property values and thus, property tax revenues of local
governments.
II. Theory and Model
A) A land market with pre-existing ad-valorem taxation and use-value
assessment
Consider a two-sector model8 of a county’s land market in which
landowners have a fixed endowment of land ( ) to allocate to agricultural (A) or
9 Over 60 percent of the private land in the 48 contiguous states of the U.S. is in farms and
ranches (Wunderlich 1997 cites the USDA-ERS 1995).  I focus on agricultural land because it is
the fastest growing category of land for conservation easements (American Farmland Trust).
10
non-agricultural (N) use.9  In Figure 1.1 below, the demand curve DN shows the
marginal valuation for each acre of non-agricultural land and DA depicts the
demand for agricultural land.  
Each parcel of land is taxed ad valorem according to its use-value in
agriculture or in non-agriculture.  Net-of-tax demand curves (DA’, DN’, and DN’’’)
are represented by dashed lines in Figures 1.1 and 1.2.  The marginal valuation of
land is the rental price on a parcel of land that would provide a stream of
agricultural (or non-agricultural) use for an interval of time.  Land is homogeneous
in quality but different parcels of land rent for different prices based on their
11
distance from downtown.  The rental price for an acre of non-agricultural land is
measured on the left vertical axis, while the rental price of agricultural land is
measured on the right vertical axis.  The length of the horizontal axis depicts the
total amount of land ( ) in the county.  
The potential for urban development on a parcel of land is a function of its
distance from downtown because businesses want to locate in areas with higher
population densities.  A county’s downtown is the urbanized county seat with the
local government’s administrative and judicial centers, schools, shops, and other
commercial businesses.  Following Park, Burgess, and McKenzie (1925), my
model assumes an urbanized county seat that is centrally located within the county. 
The county seat is surrounded by an annulus of developable open space or
12
agricultural land that is suitable for conversion to urban use.  This developable
open space is, in turn, surrounded by the remaining agricultural land in the county. 
Developable open space is suitable for conversion into urban use because of its
proximity to downtown and its readiness for construction.  
Urban land and developable open space are ordered along the horizontal
axis in Figure 1.1.  For instance, urban land located in the center of downtown is
arrayed starting from the origin 0, while the most valuable agricultural land in the
county is arrayed starting from the origin .  The downward sloping demand
curve DN shows the rental price of non-agricultural land (PN).  Non-agricultural
land earns Ricardian rents in excess of P0, the net-of-tax rental price on the
marginal or least productive parcel of land.  The Ricardian rent (for location, in
this case) declines, the further away from downtown the parcels of non-agricultural
land are located.
There are two reasons farmers locate on the outskirts of the urbanized
county seat.  The first reason is the time and pecuniary costs of transportation and
commuting.  Urban dwellers live downtown because of the relatively higher time
and pecuniary costs of commuting to work or to school from the countryside.  The
farmer, in contrast, has lower time and pecuniary costs (fewer trips and economies
of scale using large trucks) for transporting agricultural produce and farm animals
to a market outside the county.  The second reason is the nuisance factor of
farming.  Farmers locate further away from urban dwellers in order to minimize the
possibility of nuisance lawsuits.  Farming’s nuisance factors include pesticide use,
aerial spraying, manure odor, dust, flies, and noise (Telega 2003; Oberholtzer and
10 In the next section, I model use-value assessment of agricultural land as a function of the
market value of land.
11 According to van der Hoeven and King (2003, p. 2), “North Carolina tax law provides rules
that value farmland according to average cash rents received on comparable land.”  In rapidly
urbanizing counties, use-value assessment may result in substantially reduced property taxes.  In
North Carolina, “Back taxes for up to three years may be recaptured by the county if it is
13
Higgins 2001).  In Figure 1.1, the land most suitable for agriculture is arrayed
starting from the origin  and commands the highest rental price in agriculture. 
The rental price of agricultural land (PA) declines as the parcels of land are located
closer to the urbanized county seat.
The use-value assessment of agricultural land is a major source of the
agricultural tax benefit in the model.  Use-value assessment values farmland
according to the average cash rents received from agricultural use of the land. 
This is in contrast to market value assessment that values land at the recent sales
prices of comparable land.  Since local property taxes are levied on the assessed
value of real property, use-value assessment of the property is typically lower than
(but could be equal to) the market value of the land.  Therefore, use-value
assessment of agricultural land is a function (or a proportion) of the market value
of the land parcel.10
The placement of an easement on farmland enrolled in an agricultural
current use taxation program will not change its property tax.  If the property is
not enrolled in such a program, its property tax could decrease significantly with
the placement of an easement (American Farmland Trust).  Thus, use-value
assessment lowers the effective property tax rate on agricultural land and raises the
rate if the land is converted to urban use.11  The difference between the agricultural
determined that the land no longer qualifies for the [use-value taxation] program” (Feitshans and
Renkow 2002).
12 American Farmland Trust (1997).
13 For example, Tegene, Wiebe, and Kuhn (1999, 204) find that “conventional valuation
procedures may systematically overprice easements by exaggerating the returns a parcel would
generate if converted to urban use today, and simultaneously underprice easements by failing to
recognize the true option value of waiting to convert at the optimal time in the future.”   
14
and non-agricultural rates provides a direct tax on the process of urban land
conversion at the urban fringe.  Use-value assessment of agricultural land is an
example of a tax incentive policy that contains urban sprawl while preserving
agricultural land on the urban periphery (Cheshire and Sheppard 2003).12   
Even though some studies13 on the urban conversion of agricultural land
have incorporated the option value for potential development, I avoid the concept
of option value for two compelling reasons.  First, use-value assessment of
agricultural land does not tax the option value of potential development. 
Therefore, option value on agricultural land does not change the property tax
revenue of local governments.  Second, Schmalensee (1972) shows that the sign
on option value is ambiguous and depends on the relationship between the
marginal utilities of income in different states of  nature (Freeman 1992, 262-263).
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 depict both types of land being taxed at the same
nominal ad-valorem rate,  The next section develops a mathematical
treatment of how the agricultural use-value assessment (what I call the agricultural
tax benefit) lowers the effective rate of taxation on agricultural land relative to
non-agricultural land.  In Figure 1.1, the equilibrium allocation of land in the non-
agricultural sector is given by Q0 and in agriculture is given by  The
14 Assuming the landowner’s adjusted gross income is large enough for the deduction to occur. 
15
equilibrium after-tax rental price of the marginal parcel of land in both sectors (i.e.,
located on the “margin” or at the urban fringe) is P0.  At the margin, landowners
are indifferent between leasing their land for agricultural or non-agricultural use;
thus the equilibrium rental price on the marginal land clears both sectors.  Local
governments receive the shaded areas in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 as property tax
revenue. 
Figure 1.2 incorporates the income tax deduction benefits of conservation
easements into the model.  The Tax Reform Act of 1976 established the federal
income tax deductibility of conservation easement donations (Parker 2004).  This
Act provides a legal basis for the model’s treatment of the federal income tax
deduction as a subsidy to agricultural landowners who donate conservation
easements.  Since 1976, owners of agricultural land have received a deduction on
their adjusted gross income up to 30 percent of the “fair market” development
value on their easement land.14  The federal income tax deduction is modeled as a
subsidy to agricultural land owners that increases the demand for agricultural land
(DA).  When DA shifts up, with no change in the demand for non-agricultural land,
the price of marginal land in both sectors increases to P1.  The amount of land
allocated to agricultural use also increases from Q0 to Q1.  The direction of change
in local property tax revenue, however, is uncertain because the gain in revenue
from the agricultural sector—resulting from higher prices and a larger quantity of
agricultural land—may offset the loss of revenue from the non-agricultural sector.
16
B. Mathematical generalization of the model
This section provides a mathematical generalization of Figures 1.1 and 1.2
that does not assume any specific functional form or elasticities for the demand
curves in both sectors.  Appendix II provides a full derivation of the equations in
this section.  I demonstrate the conditions influencing the changes in local property
tax revenue due to the income tax deductibility of conservation easement
donations.  In equilibrium, the quantity of land demanded in both sectors must
equal the endowment of land in a county, such that .
Let  shift the demand curve for agricultural land due to the income tax
deduction subsidy of conservation easement donations.  Note that is the
initial equilibrium and denotes the increase in demand for agricultural land
from the subsidy.  Graphically, this is represented by an upward shift of DA to DA’’
in Figure 1.2.  The following equilibrium condition describes the net-of-tax prices
of agricultural and non-agricultural lands located on the margin at the urban fringe: 
I follow the Ricardian notion that the marginal land is the least
productive—in either agricultural or non-agricultural use—parcel of land in the
county.  All other parcels of land in both sectors have greater market values than
this marginal land.  Ricardian rent is the difference in the rental price over and
above the rental price for the marginal land.  In this model, since land is
homogeneous in quality, Ricardian rent is the cost advantage of farming further
away from the urbanized county seat. 
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Equation (2) is the elasticity of agricultural land acres with respect to the
conservation easement’s income tax deduction subsidy.  Equation (2) is the result
of converting the log-differentials of equation (1) into demand elasticities and
rearranging terms.
 
Since demand elasticities in both sectors are defined to be negative, the elasticity of
agricultural land acres with respect to the conservation easement subsidy is
positive.  This result confirms the graphical analysis in Figure 1.2.  
Local property taxes are levied on the assessed value of real property.  The
next equation defines the source of local property tax revenues, denoted TR.
For non-agricultural land, the assessed value of the property reflects its
“fair market value”.  For agricultural land, the use-value assessment of the
property is typically lower than (but could be equal to) the market value of the
land.  Therefore, I model the assessed use-value of agricultural land as a function
of the market value of the land, such that Assessed Use Value = f(Market Value)
.  Therefore, Equation (3) can be defined as follows. 
Finally, Equation (5) is the elasticity of local property tax revenues with respect to
15 See Appendix II for the derivation of Equation (5).
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the conservation easement subsidy.15 
where  is the agricultural sector’s share of the total
market value of land in the county.  The function  is the 
inverse of the weighted average of inverse elasticities.  Therefore, the function 
can be interpreted as an average demand elasticity for land in a county.  The sign
of the elasticity depends on the sign of the term in brackets in Equation (5). 
The sign of the term in brackets can be written as inequality (6), which is the
condition for a decline in tax revenue due to
  
The sign and magnitude of the effect of conservation easement subsidies on
local property taxes depend on four terms in Equation (5).  The first
term, is the size of the agricultural tax benefit, which also depends on the
relationship between agricultural use-value and market value of the land.  The
second term, is the proportion of non-agricultural land in the county.  The
third term,  is the Ricardian rent factor, which is the ratio of
marginal value (the rental price on the marginal parcel of land) to the average
16 A mill is one thousandth of a dollar, or one-tenth of one cent.  The millage rate is often a sum
of several revenue requirements (i.e., township, county, school district, and special districts for
fire and sanitary services) decided by local government, within the limits of state law.
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assessed use-value of agricultural land in the county.  The fourth term is the
function , which is the average demand elasticity for land in the county.
C. Comparative statics
There are two special cases involving the size of the agricultural tax
benefit.  Local property tax rates are often specified in mills16 and levied on the
assessed value of the property (Wunderlich 1997).  Thus, tax rates are nominally
equal across both sectors.  The first special case, when  simplifies Equation
(6) as follows: 
Clearly, if there is a one-to-one relationship between assessed use-value
and market value, i.e., then Equation (6') will not hold, resulting in an
increase in local property tax revenue from the conservation easement subsidy.  If,
however, there is no relationship between assessed use-value and market value,
i.e., then Equation (6') may hold, depending on the relative magnitudes of
the other three terms in the denominator on the right-hand side of the inequality. 
Thus, local property tax revenue is likely to decrease from the conservation
easement subsidy.
The second special case arises because the use-value assessment of
20
agricultural land lowers its effective rate of taxation such that  
Mathematically, the negative sign for the elasticity of property tax revenues with
respect to the conservation easement subsidy depends on condition (6) below.
 
In the case of zero agricultural Ricardian rent , the average
assessed use-value of agricultural land (AVA) is equal to the price of marginal land
(MV).  Thus, equation (6) simplifies to , which is sufficient for
  A larger proportion of non-agricultural land in the county, i.e., the
larger is ceteris paribus, the more likely it is that local property tax
revenues will decline due to .  For example, a county that is entirely agricultural,
where and collects more local property tax revenue due to the
conservation easement subsidy.  Then, the model implies a one-to-one relationship
between the subsidy and property tax because the elasticity is 
The magnitude of the agricultural tax benefit depends on the ratio between
 and and the relationship between agricultural use-value and market value
of the land.  The larger is the ratio  the larger is the agricultural tax
benefit.  A larger agricultural tax benefit, ceteris paribus, will decrease local
property tax revenue due to the conservation easement’s subsidy.  However, the
effects of the Ricardian rent factor, the proportion of non-agricultural land in the
county, and the elasticity of land could offset the negative effect of the agricultural
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tax benefit on local property tax revenue.
The zero Ricardian rent condition suggests there is no difference in the
quality of agricultural land in the county and thus no cost advantage to farming
further away from the urbanized county seat.  The absence of Ricardian rent
implies a perfectly elastic demand curve for agricultural land.  For example,
suppose the average demand for land in the county is elastic,   Local
property tax revenues will then likely decrease due to the conservation easement
subsidy.  The reverse is true if the average demand elasticity of land is inelastic
or  Here, local property tax revenues likely will increase due to the
conservation easement subsidy.  
The case of positive Ricardian rent  on agricultural land
implies heterogeneity in the location cost of farming.  Farmers and ranchers, on
average, pay a Ricardian rent on agricultural land in excess of the rental price on
marginal land (AVA > MV).  Farmers and ranchers are willing to pay a higher price
for agricultural land that lowers their farming cost.  Thus, the location or distance
from downtown of individual land parcels results in Ricardian rents and different
rental prices for different parcels.  Furthermore, Ricardian rent influences local
property tax revenue through its effect on rental prices.  If condition (6) fails to
hold in the presence of positive Ricardian rent, then local property tax revenue
increases due to the conservation easement subsidy.
17 The two extreme cases—perfectly inelastic and perfectly elastic—are quite unlikely but are
included here for completeness.  When the demand for land is perfectly inelastic, property tax
revenue will increase due to the conservation easement subsidy.  When the demand for land is
perfectly elastic, property tax revenue will decrease due to the conservation easement subsidy.
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Finally, I discuss three special cases for the average elasticity function,
.17  First, when the average elasticity is unit-elastic, Equation (6) simplifies to
.  The decrease in local property tax revenue depends on
the relative magnitudes of the agricultural tax benefit, the proportion of non-
agricultural land in the county, and the Ricardian rent factor.  For given values of
the agricultural tax benefit and  proportion of non-agricultural land in the county,
higher Ricardian rents (  is close to zero) imply a decline in local property tax
revenues due to the conservation easement subsidy.  Second, when average
demand for land is elastic, ceteris paribus,  local property tax revenues are
likely to decline due to the conservation easement subsidy.  Third, an inelastic
demand for land will result in an increase in local property tax revenues due to the
conservation easement subsidy.
In summary, is more likely to be negative, ceteris paribus, with the
following conditions: (1) the higher is i.e., the larger is the agricultural tax
benefit from the lower effective rate of taxation on agricultural land; (2) the larger
is i.e., the larger is the proportion of non-agricultural land in the county;
(3) the closer is to 1, i.e., the smaller is the Ricardian rent on agricultural
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land, which suggests a smaller cost advantage to farming further away from town;
and (4) the larger is the average elasticity i.e., the more elastic is the demand for
land.  These results have not been articulated in the public finance literature
regarding local property taxation.
D. Empirical application
Empirical application of this model predicts the sign and magnitude of the
change in local property tax revenue.  Census of Agriculture, County and City
Data Book, and county tax assessors collect data on two out of four terms in
Equation (6).  For the first term, property tax rates for both sectors are necessary
to calculate the agricultural tax benefit.  Data on total acres of agricultural land,
estimated market value of farmland and buildings, and property taxes paid are
available for each county from the quinquennial Census of Agriculture.  The
effective rate of taxation on agricultural land can be calculated by dividing the
amount of property taxes paid in the county by the market value of farmland in the
county.  These data must be treated with caution because they are generated from
a sample survey of farms in a county.  The property tax rate on non-agricultural
land can be obtained from the nominal millage rate for the county.  The left-
hand side of Equation (6),  is calculated with both tax rates.
The second term, the proportion of non-agricultural land in the county
is easily calculated by subtracting acres of agricultural land from total
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acres of land in each county.  For the third term, the marginal value (MV) and
average assessed use-value (AVA) of agricultural land are needed to calculate the
Ricardian rent factor.  I am not aware of any published sources for these data, but
county tax assessors record data on sales of agricultural land parcels.  The lowest
per-acre sale price may be a rough proxy for marginal value.  The average assessed
use-value of agricultural land can be calculated from the county’s assessment rolls,
if the property is classified by agricultural use.
The fourth and final term may prove the most challenging datum to
estimate.  The share weighted elasticity of demand for land in both sectors are
necessary to calculate the average elasticity of land in the county,
 Data for the county’s agricultural and total acreage ( )
are available publicly from the Census of Agriculture but the remaining price and
acreage data are only available from county tax assessors.  Estimating demand
elasticities for land in each sector (  and ) requires time-series data on price
and acreage of recent land sales in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors for
each county.  The following is a regression equation for the demand elasticity of
land in sector j:
Pjt is the sale price of land in sector j in year t, Qjt is the acreage of land sold in
sector j in year t, Yjt is the average level of farm income (or personal income) in the
18 If there is insufficient data on recent sales of land in the county, I may use the number of acres
in each sector and the assessed taxable values in each sector.
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county, and FPIjt is the Index of Farm Prices.18  The coefficient is the demand
elasticity of land in sector j.  The relative magnitudes of the four terms in Equation
(6) predict whether local property tax revenues will increase or decrease with the
conservation easement subsidy.
III. Conclusion
This model provides a rich theoretical framework for analyzing the
question and to predict the effect of conservation easement subsidies on local
property tax revenues.  The sign and magnitude of the change in a county’s
property tax revenue depends on four factors: the agricultural tax benefit, the
proportion of non-agricultural land, the Ricardian rent on agricultural land, and the
average elasticity of demand for land.  For instance, the decline in local property
tax revenue due to the income tax deductibility of conservation easements
depends, ceteris paribus, on the following four factors.  First, the decline is larger,
the larger is the agricultural tax benefit stemming from the lower effective rate of
taxation on agricultural land.  This is particularly true in counties with a relatively
large agricultural sector.  Second, the decline is larger, the larger is the proportion
of non-agricultural land in the county.  Third,  the decline is larger, the smaller is
the Ricardian rent on agricultural land, which suggests a smaller cost advantage to
farming away from town.  Fourth, the decline is larger, the more elastic is the
demand for land.
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Appendix I: The effective demand for non-agricultural land
Previous studies (Geoghegan, Lynch, and Bucholtz 2003; Geoghegan
2002; Irwin and Bockstael 2001) have shown that the environmental amenity
values (e.g., open space, scenic views, wildlife habitat, watershed protection, or
preserved forest) of conservation easements are capitalized into the market price of
adjacent land parcels.  Specifically, the environmental amenity value increases the
demand for non-agricultural land.  
In Figure 1.3 above, the demand curve for non-agricultural land  shifts
upwards, from to  when the amount of
agricultural land in the county increases from  to  Demanders of
non-agricultural land (such as residential renters) enjoy the scenic view of open
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space and are willing to pay a higher rental price to reside near preserved farmland. 
When conservation easements are placed on more agricultural land,  the
environmental amenity value of these preserved farmlands are capitalized into the
higher marginal valuation for parcels of non-agricultural land.  Thus the demand
for non-agricultural land increases to .  
Figure 1.3 depicts non-agricultural demand curves shifting upwards with
higher levels of agricultural land.  The DN* curve traces the locus of effective
demand for non-agricultural land with capitalized environmental values from
agricultural easements.  The analytical framework of this paper can be modified to
include this effective demand curve for non-agricultural land, but the difficulty in
estimating environmental amenity values and thus DN* precludes this modification.
Appendix II: The derivation of equations (2) and (4)
In equilibrium, the quantity of land demanded in both sectors must equal
the endowment of land in a county, such that .  Let  represent the
income tax deduction subsidy of conservation easement donations.  When
the demand curve for agricultural land shifts upwards.  The following
equilibrium condition describes net-of-tax prices for agricultural and non-
agricultural lands located on the “margin” of the urban fringe:  
Log-differentiating equation (1) yields the following:
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Convert the log-differentials into demand elasticity terms:
Rearranging (3) results in the elasticity of agricultural land acres with respect to
the income tax deductibility of conservation easements:
Local property taxes are levied on the assessed value of real property.  The next
equation defines the source of local property tax revenues, denoted TR.
For non-agricultural land, the assessed value of the property reflects its “fair
market value”.  For agricultural land, the use-value assessment of the property is
typically lower than (but could be equal to) the market value of the land. 
Therefore, I model the assessed use-value of agricultural land as a function of the
market value of the land, such that Assessed Use Value = f(Market Value) 
.  Thus, Equation (5) can defined as follows: 
Applying the chain rule when log-differentiating the term for assessed use-value of
agricultural land yields the following result:
29
 
 Therefore, total log-differentiating equation (5') yields the following:
where , is agriculture’s 
tax revenue share, which can be expressed as a share of the weighted sum of both 
tax rates.  Define  as agriculture’s share of 
total assessed land value in a county.  Differentiate the integrals in equation (7) and 
rearrange terms as follows:
Rearrange the denominator of each term and substitute (4) into (8):
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Defining the average values in the denominator of in terms of shares will allow for
some simplification: 
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At the margin, the price on the least productive parcel of land is defined as
 Factoring the common MV and elasticity terms yields:
Let 
where is agriculture’s share of total land 
value in a county. 
Define the function as the inverse of the weighted 
average of inverse elasticities.  Therefore, the function can be interpreted as an
average demand elasticity for land in a county.  Thus, the equation of interest,  the
elasticity of local property tax revenues with respect to the conservation easement
subsidy, is as follows: 
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ANTITRUST AND POLITICS: PRESIDENTIAL PARTY CONTROL, 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT, OR BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION?1 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 Politics seem to permeate the conduct of antitrust policy in the United 
States. The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Antitrust Division (hereinafter the 
Division) work actively with the executive branch through regulatory and 
legislative processes “to ensure that government action is pro-competitive or not 
unnecessarily anti-competitive.”  The Division also prepares reports for Congress 
and advises the President and other agencies in the executive branch about 
antitrust matters.  Thus, antitrust activity in this country is connected to both the 
executive and legislative branches of the government.  I outline these connections 
below. 
 The Division is headed by a presidential appointee who is confirmed by 
the Senate.  The President has considerable discretion in nominating a Division 
head who is amenable to pursuing the President’s agenda in antitrust enforcement.  
The Senate, which has the authority to confirm the appointment of the Division 
head, could accept or reject the President’s nominee.  Congressional oversight 
committees have the power to appropriate Division budgets, impel testimony by 
the head of the Division, and request hearings and reports from the Division.  The 
following are Congressional committees with the greatest oversight for the 
                                                 
1 This work was supported by an Earhart Foundation Fellowship.  I thank Bob Tollison, Bobby 
McCormick, Mike Maloney, Chuck Thomas, and Bill Dougan for comments on earlier drafts of 
this paper.  I am grateful to Ms. Janie Ingalls of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Documents 
Group for providing the data used in this paper.  The usual caveat applies. 
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Antitrust Division: House and Senate Appropriations Committees, House and 
Senate Committees on the Judiciary (especially the Senate Subcommittee on 
Antitrust, Competition, and Business Rights), and the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation.2  
 It seems reasonable to think that Democratic presidents differ from 
Republican presidents on many policy issues, including their preference for 
antitrust activism.  Conventional wisdom states that Democratic presidents are 
more “activist” and prefer stronger antitrust enforcement.  Similar arguments have 
been made about Democratic majorities in the House of Representatives and the 
Senate.  These Democratic majorities translate into chairmanship and members’ 
control of key oversight committees.  Thus, the legislators’ party affiliations 
indicate their preferences for different levels of antitrust activism. 
 Against this backdrop of presidential party control and congressional 
oversight, I examine the role of political affiliation in explaining a long time 
series of the Antitrust Division’s case output.  I measure political affiliation as the 
president’s party and congressional oversight as the majority party in the House 
and the Senate.  Political affiliation may affect the Antitrust Division’s case 
output through the following three channels.  First, does the party affiliation of the 
President signal his preference for a certain level of antitrust activism?  Second, 
does the President appoint an Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust who 
reflects the President’s policy agenda for antitrust enforcement?  Third, does the 
majority party in the House and Senate (and resulting control over the House and 
                                                 
2 See testimony listed on the Antitrust Division’s website at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/testimon.htm.  
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Senate Appropriations Committees) signal legislators’ preferences for antitrust 
activism and their willingness to pay for it?  If both presidential party control and 
congressional oversight do not influence antitrust enforcement patterns, then 
Division bureaucrats are largely independent of political pressure from the 
President and Congress.  Bureaucratic discretion is the null hypothesis in 
explaining antitrust enforcement.  While the alternative hypothesis is that the 
bureaucrats are not independent and that they bow to pressure from the 
President’s party and congressional party affiliations. 
 The study of antitrust enforcement is particularly important because the 
Division has large off-budget effects on the economy in terms of the amount of 
fines collected and the number of prominent firms found guilty of antitrust 
violations.3  See Table 2.1 below.  From 1995 to 2005, the Division’s 
appropriated budget (in real 2000 dollars) totaled $1.254 billion, while it collected 
$3.040 billion in fines, more than 2.4 times its budget appropriations.  It is 
interesting to note that this period encompasses the three largest criminal antitrust 
fines ever collected: the $500 million fine against F. Hoffman-LaRoche and $225 
million against BASF in the international vitamins price-fixing cartel in 1999 and 
the $300 million fine against Samsung for price-fixing in dynamic random access 
memory (DRAM) in 2005. 
 Previous studies find conflicting results on the effect of politics on 
antitrust activity because they examine different sub-periods and focus on each 
political entity in isolation.  I model antitrust enforcement as the result of an 
                                                 
3 I do not examine mergers in this paper and thus do not include the loss from unapproved mergers 
that result from DOJ investigations. 
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optimization problem among the President, legislators, and Division bureaucrats.  
I also employ a long time series of data, 1903-2005, and include the political 
affiliations of the President and Congressional majorities in my estimation. 
 
Table 2.1 - The Antitrust Division's Annual Budget and Fines Collected (in Real 
2000 Dollars), 1995-2005 
Fiscal Year Real Annual Budget ($'000) Real Fines Imposed ($'000) 
1995 82,359 38,164 
1996 79,842 25,168 
1997 88,204 195,760 
1998 90,195 235,526 
1999 99,475 951,431 
2000 110,000 308,421 
2001 123,738 279,344 
2002 136,271 106,806 
2003 141,667 68,339 
2004 145,687 154,548 
2005 156,441 676,946 
 ____________ ____________ 
 1,253,879 3,040,453 
Sources: Appropriation Figures for the Antitrust Division 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/10804a.htm   
And Workload Statistics http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workstats.htm 
 
 This paper is organized as follows:  section II provides the institutional 
background and related public choice literature.  Section III presents a model of 
antitrust and politics that generates predictions and testable hypotheses.  Section 
IV discusses the data, estimation techniques, and results.  Section V concludes. 
 
II. Institutional background and related literature 
 The passing of the Sherman Act (1890) established the Department of 
Justice’s power to prosecute criminal antitrust violations that involves restraint of 
trade (§1 prohibits price-fixing, bid-rigging, and allocation of customers) and 
monopolization (§2 outlaws attempts to suppress competition through predatory 
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acts).  In 1903, thirteen years after the passing of the Sherman Act, the office of 
the Assistant to the Attorney General was established to administer antitrust 
laws.4  This office receives funding separate from the rest of the Department of 
Justice.5   
U.S. federal antitrust laws were further buttressed in 1914 by the passing 
of the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.  The Clayton Act is a 
civil statute carrying no criminal penalties that prohibits anticompetitive mergers 
and acquisitions.6  The Division scrutinizes all corporate mergers or acquisitions 
worth more than $10 million for potential anticompetitive effects.  The Division 
can challenge or block a merger if the economic analysis shows significant 
competitive harm to consumers. 
                                                 
4 An excerpt from the Antitrust Division’s website regarding its history:  “The Division's 
organizational roots can be traced to the creation of an Assistant to the Attorney General in March 
1903, to take charge of all suits under the antitrust and interstate commerce laws, and to assist the 
Attorney General and the Solicitor General in the conduct of the general executive work of the 
Department. The post was created under President Theodore Roosevelt and Attorney General 
Philander Knox. With the growth of the economy and of corporate enterprise, it became evident 
that the Department of Justice must have its own corps of specialists in antitrust law to cope with 
an increasingly complex enforcement situation. Consequently, in 1933, under the administration 
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Attorney General Homer S. Cummings, the Antitrust 
Division was established.”  Source: http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/mps/mission2000/mission.htm. 
 
5 The appropriation of $500,000 authorized for FY 1904 was used to fund the Assistant to the 
Attorney General for FYs 1903 through 1907.  An average of $100,000 is imputed as the annual 
budget for each FY from 1903 to 1907 in my dataset.  Source for budget data: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/10804a.htm. 
 
6 An excerpt from the Antitrust Division’s website regarding the recent change in criminal 
penalties:  “The Department of Justice alone is empowered to bring criminal prosecutions under 
the Sherman Act. For offenses committed before June 22, 2004, individual violators can be fined 
up to $350,000 and sentenced to up to 3 years in federal prison for each offense, and corporations 
can be fined up to $10 million for each offense. For offenses committed on or after June 22, 2004, 
individual violators can be fined up to $1 million and sentenced to up to 10 years in federal prison 
for each offense, and corporations can be fined up to $100 million for each offense. Under some 
circumstances, the maximum fines can go even higher than the Sherman Act maximums to twice 
the gain or loss involved.”  Source: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/div_stats/211491.htm.  
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The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, also a civil statute without 
criminal penalties, created the sister agency to the Division that investigates unfair 
methods of competition.  The Unites States is unique in having a dual-agency 
enforcement of antitrust laws but the Division and the FTC have gone through 
periods of competition and cooperation in antitrust enforcement.  Since 1948, the 
Division and the FTC have cooperated on a formal liaison agreement to allocated 
antitrust investigations based on their different areas of expertise.7  In this paper I 
focus only on the case output of the Antitrust Division and not the FTC because 
there have been numerous empirical studies on the FTC (see references cited), 
while the Division is not as widely researched.  The FTC’s five-Commissioner 
governance system (two Republicans, two Democrats, and one Independent, each 
with staggered tenure) complicates the inclusion of the presidential political party 
in the dataset. 
I use modern public choice theory’s empirical approach to model the 
regulator-politician’s response to special interests.  Empirical public choice 
studies have shown that regulator-politicians and bureaucrats do not act in the 
public interest, especially in antitrust policy.  For example, Long, Schramm, and 
Tollison (1973) show that the Division does not initiate antitrust investigations 
based on the loss of consumer welfare during the period 1945-1970.  The authors 
use Harberger’s (1954) model for measuring welfare loss or resource 
                                                 
7 Antitrust Division Manual, Chapter VII, Antitrust Division Relationships with Other Agencies 
and with the Public http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/divisionmanual/ch7.htm#a.  “Traditionally, 
duplication of investigations has been avoided in two areas. First, pursuant to a liaison agreement, 
the Department has referred all civil Robinson-Patman Act matters to the FTC for action, and, 
second, the FTC routinely refers possible criminal violations of the antitrust laws, such as price 
fixing, to the Division. The two agencies enforce the balance of the antitrust laws--particularly 
merger investigations (section 7 of the Clayton Act) and civil non-merger investigations (sections 
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act)--concurrently.” 
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misallocation resulting from a monopoly.  They find that the welfare loss triangle 
and excess profit explain very little of the period’s antitrust activity.  In fact, the 
authors find that industry size, as measured by sales, is the most important 
explanatory variable for the Division’s antitrust case-bringing activities.  In 
another paper, Siegfried (1975) suggests that antitrust regulation is used to prop 
up the market prices charged by firms in regulated industries.  Furthermore, 
Siegfried shows that the increase in the number of antitrust cases is associated 
with greater levels of excess profits in regulated industries and lower levels of 
welfare losses.  Shughart (1997, 339) claims that antitrust bureaucrats “seem to 
use the discretion available to them to further their own interest rather than those 
of the public at large.”   
These studies provide the motivation for my use of Stigler’s (1964) and 
Peltzman’s (1976) models of regulation with special interests.  I then test a 
principal-agent model within the context of this special interest model.  I assume 
that Democrats and Republicans differ on their “taste” for antitrust enforcement 
and their willingness to “pay” for it.  Democrats are perceived to be populist or 
consumer-oriented and more likely to transfer wealth from firms to consumers.  
Thus, Democrats have a greater preference for antitrust activism and are more 
willing to appropriate money to pay for it.  The President appoints a party loyalist 
as the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust who will carry out his party’s 
agenda for antitrust enforcement.  Since the Assistant Attorney General is a 
political appointee, he will have to be confirmed by the Senate.  The Senate may 
subject the White House and the nominee to a difficult confirmation process 
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during periods when the party in control of the White House is different from the 
party in control of the Senate. 
 The evidence on the effect of the President’s party on antitrust policy is 
mixed.  Posner (1970) finds that antitrust activity is countercyclical but the 
President’s party has no significant effect on the number of antitrust cases filed 
during the period 1890-1969.  Posner’s analysis does not use any econometric 
analysis, but he relies instead on computed averages of cases that Democrat and 
Republican presidents “should have” filed during each term.  Yandle (1988) 
concludes that Republican Administrations tend to decrease Division budgets for 
the period 1951-1979.  Yandle also finds that new Presidents increase the 
Division’s budget in order to appoint more bureaucrats who are supportive of the 
President’s antitrust policies.  Moreover, Kwoka (1999) shows that Democratic 
presidents increase, on average, the DOJ’s budget by nearly $14 million for the 
period 1970-1997.  Kwoka claims (1999, 299), “It is commonly believed that the 
Democratic Party favors stronger antitrust policy, although some past evidence is 
equivocal on this issue.” 
 Figure 2.1 shows the number of antitrust cases initiated by each 
presidential term for the period 1903-2005.  The red columns represent 
Republican presidents, while the blue columns represent Democratic presidents.  
There does not appear to be any discernible pattern, except that the number of 
cases has trended upward from 1903 to reach its peak during Reagan’s first term 
in office.  A majority of the cases during Reagan’s first term were filed by 
Assistant Attorney General William Baxter against highway construction firms 
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for bid-rigging violations.  Since that peak, the number of antitrust cases has 
decreased steadily, even though the Division has collected greater amounts of 
criminal fines (See Table 2.1).  One possible explanation may be a shift of 
Division resources to pursue fewer cases with greater perceived harm (thus, the 
large fines imposed on guilty firms) against consumers.  Since the number of 
antitrust cases filed has increased along with the size of the economy, I also 
examine the number of cases filed relative to the real GDP, shown as the dark 
blue line below.  Since the end of World War II, the number of cases filed relative 
to the real GDP has decreased steadily.  Since Figure 2.1 suggests that individual 
presidential terms may affect the pattern of antitrust enforcement, I control for 
both political party effect and each individual president’s effect in my data 
analysis in Section IV. 
Figure 2.1 - Antitrust Cases Filed During Each Presidential Term
1903-2005
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Congressional oversight is a possible explanatory variable for regulatory 
agency output because House and Senate appropriations committees control the 
budget appropriations for the Division.  Lindsay (1976) and Rogowsky (1987) 
suggest that regulatory agencies and bureaucrats are evaluated on their “visible” 
output, even though their mission involves producing an “invisible” output.  The 
original goals of antitrust policy include the promotion of competition and the 
protection of consumers from anticompetitive harm in the marketplace.  Both of 
these goals are difficult to measure.  Therefore, Congress estimates bureaucratic 
output through some crude observable proxies, such as investigations initiated and 
the number of cases won.  The focus on visible output skews the bureaucrats’ 
incentives and diverts resources from the production of invisible output—which 
are the original goals of the agency—to visible output such as initiating more 
investigations and winning more cases (particularly those that are smaller, easier 
to win, and do not take up a lot of resources).   
 Weingast and Moran (1983) offer further evidence for the congressional 
oversight hypotheses.  They find that changing political majority and ideology of 
congressional oversight committees influence the case selection at the FTC for the 
period 1964-1976.  They examine four categories of cases—credit, textiles, 
Robinson-Patman, and merger cases.  Merger is the omitted category, since it has 
the most stable number of cases throughout the period.  Weingast and Moran 
measure political ideology of individual committee members by their ADA scores 
and estimate the probability that a certain type of case would be filed based on the 
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ADA scores of the oversight committee chairman and members.8  Appropriation 
committees controlled by the Democrats have a higher probability of opening 
more Robinson-Patman cases, but fewer credit and textile cases, relative to 
merger cases.  For example, a ten-point increase in the Senate subcommittee 
chairman’s ADA score increases the probability of opening a credit case by 2.4 
percent, but decreases the probability of opening a textile case by 0.06 percent 
and a Robinson-Patman case by 0.13 percent.   
Bureaucrats decide how many investigations and which cases to pursue, 
subject to their annual budget constraint.  This is particularly true for rank-and-
file Division bureaucrats who are not political appointees and thus are not affected 
by the identity of the President or the majority party in the Congress.  Recall that 
bureaucratic discretion is the null hypothesis explaining antitrust enforcement, 
while presidential control and congressional oversight are the alternative 
hypotheses.  The conclusion that bureaucrats are independent and have wide 
discretion over case selection is only valid if presidential control and 
congressional oversight are insignificant in explaining antitrust enforcement. 
Katzmann (1980) and Weaver (1977) explain how the internal incentives 
of bureaucrats can affect agency output, case selection, budgetary appropriations, 
and personnel allocation.  In models of bureaucratic discretion, Katzmann and 
Weaver assume that bureaucrats have complete discretion over the conduct of 
antitrust policy.  At the Division, the incentives and preferences of the Assistant 
Attorney General for Antitrust govern the case selection and allocation of 
                                                 
8 The ADA score is the Americans for Democratic Action’s voting index, ranging from 0 (very 
conservative politician) to 100 (very liberal politician). 
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resources to specific cases or bureaucratic areas.  Since the Assistant Attorney 
General is a lawyer, his decisions depend on whether he is a careerist attorney 
(professional government bureaucrat who will remain in public service) or an 
outsider (appointed from private practice, with the intention of leaving public 
service for private practice after his government tenure).  A careerist attorney will 
select larger cases with longer gestation periods and cases with greater perceived 
harm to the economy.  But as a career bureaucrat, he will balance his long-term 
goals with the need for producing “visible” output to demonstrate his productivity 
to Congress and the White House.  If the Assistant Attorney General is an 
outsider who will return to private practice after his tenure, his incentives are 
skewed towards prosecuting smaller cases that will not take a long time to 
prosecute and will be easy to win.  He wants to signal his productivity (with many 
successful prosecutions) to private law firms.9   
It is widely understood that Division attorneys view their temporary tenure 
at the Department of Justice as training before entering private practice.  Weaver 
(1977, 38-40) states, “Experience in the Antitrust Division became newly 
valuable to a young lawyer who wanted eventually to work in private practice.”  
Katzmann (1980) further notes that “the ultimate career goal of most members of 
the FTC’s legal staff is a job with a prestigious private law firm.”  He finds that 
the FTC’s case selection is skewed towards smaller cases that are easily won.  
                                                 
9 At the present time, I am unable to differentiate between small and large cases in my 1903-2005 
dataset.  I leave for future study, the examination of the bureaucratic productivity hypotheses using 
a detailed case-level dataset available for the period 1994-2006. 
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Thus, it is not inconceivable that Division attorneys initiate many investigations in 
order to increase their “visible” output to Congress.10   
Eisner and Meier’s (1990) study also provides support for the bureaucratic 
discretion hypothesis.  The authors conclude that the antitrust enforcement record 
during 1959-1984 is due to bureaucratic policies initiated before the Reagan 
administration and not due to the influence of presidential or congressional 
politics, as is commonly thought.  They cite Assistant Attorney General Thomas 
Kauper’s 1972 initiative to increase the number of Ph.D. economists (as part of 
the Economic Policy Office) to serve as independent analysts on antirust cases.  
The authors claim that this bureaucratic initiative in 1972, and not the Reagan 
administration, led to the revolution in antitrust under Reagan’s first term. 
The preceding literature review outlines the three possible hypotheses—
presidential control, congressional oversight or bureaucratic discretion—for 
explaining the role of politics in antitrust policy.  The next section explicitly 
models the effect of the White House and Congress in influencing Division 
bureaucrats’ case output. 
 
III. A Demand and Supply Model of Antitrust Enforcement 
The relationship between political influence and antitrust activity can be 
captured by a demand and supply model of antitrust enforcement.  My model 
assumes that the executive branch and both chambers of the legislative branch 
(House of Representatives and Senate) have significant influences on the 
                                                 
10 Unfortunately, I am unable to obtain data on bureaucrats’ wages, post-DOJ employment, and 
GS ratings in order to directly examine the bureaucratic incentives hypothesis. 
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budgetary appropriations and case output of the Division.  The demanders of 
antitrust cases are politicians who maximize their political majority subject to the 
competing interests of producers and consumers.  In other words, politicians 
demand antitrust cases because their constituents value the wealth transfer 
generated by these antitrust cases.  The suppliers are Division bureaucrats who 
“produce” antitrust investigations and case filings. 
 On the demand side, I follow Stigler’s (1971) and Peltzman’s (1976) 
models of the behavior of politicians in the market for regulation.  These 
politicians are the U.S. Representative and Senators who sit on congressional 
appropriations committees and determine the Division’s annual budget.  In a 
special application of Peltzman’s model, politicians supply price-entry regulation 
to satisfy their two main constituents: consumers who seek lower prices and 
producers who seek price controls and entry-limit regulation in order to increase 
their profits.  I translate Peltzman’s example of the politician’s price-control 
regulation into the number of antitrust cases demanded in my model.   
The politician maximizes her political payoff subject to the producers’ 
profit function, which is directly related to price and inversely related to costs, 
depicted as the profit hill in Figure 2.2 below.  Her political payoff is a function of 
lower prices and higher profits, which generates a series of iso-majority curves, 
MiMi in Figure 2.2 below.  These iso-majority curves describe the politician’s 
preferences or rate of tradeoff between higher profits for producers and lower 
prices for consumers.  I assume that politicians of different parties have different 
preferences regarding their rate of tradeoff between pro-producer versus pro-
 49
consumer regulation, characterized by the slope of their iso-majority curves.  
Conventional wisdom states that Democrat politicians have steeper iso-majority 
curves or a higher rate of tradeoff between consumer price cuts versus producer 
profits because they are viewed as populist politicians who protect consumers 
from Big Business.  Conversely, Republican politicians have flatter iso-majority 
curves because they are pro-business.  Therefore, the slope of the iso-majority 
curves represents a politician’s taste for antitrust action and her willingness to 
allocate resources to the Division’s budget.11 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 The slope of the iso-majority curves could also depend on the size of the economy.  Hirschleifer 
(1976) describes this result as sharing the pain with pro-producer regulation during economic 
downturns and sharing the gain with pro-consumer regulation during economic expansions.  
Therefore, I include the size of the economy (real GDP) in my regression analyses in Section IV. 
Figure 2.2 - Politician-Regulator’s Iso-majority Curves Trading Off 
Lower Prices for the Consumers and Higher Profits for the Producers 
(Peltzman 1976, Figure II) 
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Peltzman’s solution to the politician’s problem is the equalization of the 
marginal political product of a dollar of profits to producers and the marginal 
political product of a dollar price cut to consumers.  The political equilibrium 
occurs at tangency A, shown on Figure 2.2 above, between the profit function and 
an iso-majority curve M3M3 and results in a politically optimal amount of 
regulation (regulated price of P0) or the politically optimal number of antitrust 
cases in my model.  Thus, the solution to the politician’s problem results in her 
demand for antitrust cases.  She is willing to demand a certain number of cases 
and also to appropriate a certain amount of tax revenues to pay for these cases.  
The demand curve for antitrust cases is inversely related to the demand price or 
“value” to politicians, arraying the highest-valued cases followed by lower-valued 
cases in the set of possible case investigations pursued by Division bureaucrats.  
Politicians rank-order antitrust cases by their demand intensity.  For instance, the 
cases that are alleged to cause a great deal of anticompetitive harm to consumers 
may have a high value to politicians because of great public interest or great 
expected publicity.  Thus, marginal benefit of additional antitrust cases declines 
because additional cases have smaller consumer harm, due to the rank-ordering of 
the cases.   
 On the supply side, I model Division bureaucrats’ behavior in filing 
antitrust cases.  For simplicity, I assume that each case costs the same amount of 
time and money to litigate.  The annual number of cases filed makes up the 
“visible output” of the Antitrust Division (Lindsay 1976).  The bureaucrats are 
assumed to choose their visible output to maximize their expected benefit 
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function subject to their appropriated budget constraint.  The expected benefit 
function includes some combination of bureaucratic incentives along with how 
much bureaucrats care about consumer surplus and producer surplus.  As the 
suppliers of antitrust cases, Division bureaucrats can rank-order their case load by 
the amount of anticompetitive harm inflicted by an antitrust violation combined 
with the probability of winning the case in court.  The most egregious 
anticompetitive cases have a high probability of winning in court and are thus 
“cheaper” to produce.  Therefore, the bureaucrats’ supply function reflects 
increasing marginal cost of prosecuting additional cases. 
 Within a demand and supply framework, there is a strong assumption of 
price-taking behavior in a competitive model.  Unfortunately, the market for 
antitrust action is not competitive.  In fact, there are only two sellers (DOJ and 
FTC) and three aggregate buyers in a representative democracy (President, 
Senate, and House).  In order to resolve this theoretical quandary, I follow 
Peltzman’s (1976) assumption that sufficient competition exists for the 
politician’s office and that each U.S. Representative or Senator constitutes an 
effective demander. 
 The market for antitrust cases has the politician moving first, followed by 
the Division bureaucrats.  The politician determines her individual demand for 
cases and her willingness to appropriate a budget to pay for these cases.  Then, the 
Division bureaucrats determine their caseload (quantity supplied of a “visible” 
output) subject to the politician’s appropriated budget.  Putting the politician’s 
demand and the bureaucrats’ supply together, we observe equilibrium price and 
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quantity of antitrust cases each year.  In other words, the annual appropriated 
budget and number of cases filed result from the politician’s and bureaucrats’ 
optimizations.   
Since we only observe the equilibrium price-quantity pair each year, I use 
a reduced form equation to estimate the effect of politics in shifting the 
equilibrium.  Equation (1) below shows the equilibrium budget and caseload that 
are affected by demand and supply shifters such as political preference for 
antitrust and general economic conditions.  The demand and supply shifters are 
binary dummy variables equal to one to indicate a Democratic White House, 
Democratic majorities in the Senate, Democratic majority in the House, and 
Democratic control in all three.  The dummy variable All_Republican, however, 
takes on the value of one when the White House and both chambers of Congress 
are controlled by the Republican Party. 
(1) Casest = f(Real Budgett, Real GDPt, Democrat_Presidentt,  
  Democrat_Houset, Democrat_Senatet, Democrat_Congresst, 
 All_Democratt, or All_Republicant) 
for t = 1903 to 2005.   
My model yields two testable hypotheses regarding the effect of politics 
on antitrust policy changes.  The first model prediction regarding presidential 
party control is an empirical test of conventional wisdom that Democratic 
politicians prefer more antitrust activism.  The model predicts that a Democratic 
President will appoint Division bureaucrats who are activists in increasing the 
supply of antitrust cases, ceteris paribus. Thus, the average price of an antitrust 
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case falls and the quantity of antitrust cases increases.  A positive and significant 
coefficient on the Democrat_President dummy variable is evidence in support of 
this first prediction.  The second model prediction regarding congressional 
oversight states that Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, ceteris 
paribus, will increase the Division’s budget appropriations and the demand for 
antitrust cases. Thus, the average price and the quantity of antitrust cases would 
increase.  Positive and significant coefficients on the Democrat_House, 
Democrat_Senate, or Democrat_Congress dummy variables are supportive of this 
second prediction. 
 
IV. Data, Estimation, and Results 
I obtain time series data on Division case output in order to test the 
hypothesis that presidential party control and congressional control can explain 
antitrust activity.  These data are from the Antitrust Division’s Workload 
Statistics from 1938 to 2005.12  The Division’s annual budget figures are obtain 
from its website and start in 1903, the year the Office of the Assistant Attorney 
General in charge of Antitrust was created.  For the period 1903-1937, I use 
Posner’s (1970) data from his statistical study of antitrust enforcement from 1890 
to 1969.  See Figure 2.3 for the line graphs of Posner’s data and the Division’s 
Workload Statistics.  Both time series for number of cases filed track each other 
quite consistently.  The difference between the Workload Statistics data and 
Posner’s data is due to Posner’s consolidation into a single observation, the 
                                                 
12 I thank Ms. Janie Ingalls of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Documents Group for 
providing me with hard copies of the Workload Statistics reports. 
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multiple case filings in a year that involve one firm.13  I am able to analyze a 
longer time series from 1903 to 2005 by combining Posner’s 1903-1937 data with 
the 1938-2005 Workload Statistics data.  
Figure 2.3 - Department of Justice Antitrust Cases Filed and the Real GDP
1903-2005
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See Table 2.2 for summary statistics of the data.  Some of these data series 
cover different time periods due to changes in reporting format and data 
availability of the Division’s Workload Statistics.  For instance, the number of all 
cases filed covers 1903-2005, the number of cases filed (separated by statute: 
Sherman §1, Sherman §2, Clayton §7, and other) covers 1958-2005, and the 
number of investigations initiated (separated by statute: Sherman §1, Sherman §2, 
Clayton §7, and other) covers 1970-2005.  In order to use the longest time series 
                                                 
13 Posner (1970, 367) states, “The reason for this discrepancy is that, with trivial exceptions, every 
antitrust complaint, indictment, and information is assigned a separate [Commerce Clearing 
House] Bluebook number when it is filed, with the result that frequently what I consider a single 
proceeding is counted two or more times.” 
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available, I focus on the natural log of the total cases filed relative to real GDP as 
the main dependent variable of my analysis.  Recall from Figure 2.1 that as the 
number of antitrust cases filed by the Division increases over time, it has not 
increased as rapidly as the size of the economy.  I deflated the total number of 
cases filed by the real GDP to gauge the impact of the antitrust caseload relative 
to the size of the economy. 
 
Table 2.2 - Summary Statistics           
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Year 103 1954 29.88 1903 2005 
Real total budget ($'000) 103 18564.61 36851.63 6.08 156441.40 
Natural log of real total budget 103 6.56 3.25 1.81 11.96 
Differenced real budget ($'000) 102 1533.68 3353.73 -2517.29 17261.02 
Real GDP ($ billion) 103 3276.59 3012.40 413.60 11048.60 
Natural log of real GDP 103 7.61 1.04 6.02 9.31 
Differenced real GDP ($ billion) 102 104.12 124.26 -196.90 403.40 
Total cases filed (civil and criminal) 103 45.98 32.80 1 114 
Natural log of total cases filed 
relative to real GDP 
103 -4.22 0.66 -6.02 -2.42 
Natural log of total cases filed 103 3.39 1.12 0.00 4.74 
Differenced total cases filed 102 0.40 16.06 -56 79 
Posner's total cases filed 67 22.87 17.15 1 71 
Sherman 1 cases filed 48 50.42 23.10 19 103 
Sherman 2 cases filed 48 3.69 4.64 0 19 
Clayton 7 cases filed 48 9.94 5.97 3 26 
Other cases filed 48 10.15 7.10 1 34 
Total civil cases filed 68 26.03 13.95 3 72 
Total criminal cases filed 68 38.51 26.65 5 100 
Sources: Posner (1970), budget appropriations at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/10804a.htm, 
and workload statistics at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workstats.htm. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 shows that the time series for Sherman §1 cases filed closely 
follows the trend of total cases filed.  Merger challenges (Clayton §7) and cases 
for other statutes are rather small in number and do not significantly change my 
findings. 
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Figure 2.4 - Price-Fixing (Sherman 1) and Merger (Clayton 7) Cases Filed 
Relative to All Cases Filed and the Real GDP, 1903-2005
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I include the real GDP (in 2000 dollars) in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 to illustrate 
the slightly procyclical pattern of the case filings, with a correlation coefficient of 
0.6684, for the entire period of 1903-2005.  This is in contrast to Posner’s finding 
of a countercyclical pattern in antitrust filings since 1940, when the size of the 
economy increased significantly without an accompanying increase in antitrust 
filings.  In fact, these correlation results are very sensitive to the particular sub-
period chosen for analysis.  See Table 2.3 for correlation coefficients between real 
GDP and number of case filings for different sub-periods.   
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Table 2.3 – The Correlation Coefficients Between the Real GDP and the Number of Case 
Filings for Different Sub-periods 
Period 
Correlation  
Coefficient Period Description 
1903-2005 0.6684 Entire sample period 
1903-1929 0.1358 Beginning of period and before the Depression 
1903-1939 0.3160 Beginning of period and after the Depression 
1929-1939 0.4874 Great Depression 
1940-1945 -0.8702 World War II 
1940-1969 -0.1069 Posner's countercyclical period, including WWII 
1940-2005 0.3013 My procyclical period, including WWII 
1946-1969 0.3132 Posner's later period, excluding WWII 
1946-2005 0.3540 My procyclical period, excluding WWII 
Sources: Posner (1970) and Workload Statistics http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workstats.htm 
and hard copies for 1938-2005. 
 
For instance, the correlation between the size of the economy and antitrust 
activity is procyclical for the period from 1903 to 1939 but becomes 
countercyclical for the period 1940 to 1969 (corresponding to Posner’s (1970) 
countercyclical findings).  The countercyclical result, however, disappears when 
the sub-period is extended to 2005 because antitrust activity is procyclical from 
1940 to 2005.  Posner offers a plausible hypothesis for the procyclical result: as 
the economy expands, the incidence of antitrust violations and the resources 
appropriated to investigate cases are also increasing.   
In contrast, Amacher, Higgins, Shughart and Tollison (1985) find a 
countercyclical result for the FTC’s enforcement activity.  Their dependent 
variables are FTC antitrust cases for the period 1915-1981 and Robinson-Patman 
cases for the period 1937-1981, while their independent variables include various 
measures of general economic conditions such as the real gross national product, 
the unemployment rate of the civilian labor force, the business failure rate per 
10,000 firms, and the excess capacity rate.  Their result supports Peltzman’s 
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(1976) hypothesis that producer protection regulation increases in response to an 
economic downturn. 
 Recall that my model is an empirical test of conventional wisdom, which 
holds that a Democrat President would appoint Division bureaucrats who are 
likely to supply more antitrust cases, because Democratic Party loyalists have a 
stronger preference for antitrust activism and for transferring wealth from firms to 
consumers.  My model also predicts that Democratic majorities in the House and 
Senate would increase the direct appropriations of the Division because elected 
Democratic politician-regulators will demand more antitrust cases in order to 
transfer wealth from firms to consumers.  In the style of Peltzman’s model, 
Democratic regulators in my model face a steeper set of iso-majority indifference 
curves, with different elasticities of substitution, than Republican regulators.  My 
model’s demand and supply of antitrust cases, influenced by politics, result in an 
equilibrium “price” and “quantity” that is estimated by the following reduced 
form regression equation. 
(2) ln(Casest/GDPt) = β0 + β1Diff_ln(Budgett) + β2Democrattk + β3Timet + εt  
for t = 1903 to 2005 and in different model specifications, for k = Democrat 
President, Democrat House, Democrat Senate, Democrat Congress 
(House*Senate), All Democrat (President, House, and Senate) and All 
Republican.   
 The reduced form estimation using time series data employs ordinary least 
squares (OLS) with robust standard errors, which accounts for heteroskedasticity 
in the residuals.  Annual budget and GDP are deflated to real year 2000 dollars.  
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When dealing with time series data, one must be cautious of non-stationary data 
(where a unit root exists), which could result in spurious t-statistics and incorrect 
inferences.  I use tests for unit root and first-differencing of the data to correct the 
non-stationarity problem.  For the dependent variable, I deflate the number of 
cases filed by the real GDP to control for the effect suggested by Posner (1970) 
that the size of the economy influences the incidence of antitrust violations and 
also the resources appropriated to the Division.  Since the time series of the real 
budget is non-stationary, I use the first-difference of the natural log of the real 
budget.  The Phillips-Perron test for unit root and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test both confirm that the dependent variable and the first-differenced natural log 
of real budget do not contain unit roots.  Excluded variables that will affect the 
annual caseload are captured by the error term, εt.  I include a linear time trend to 
model the rising budget appropriations, over time, for the Antitrust Division. 
 Table 2.4 presents the regression results for equation (2).  The political 
dummies show mixed results in explaining the number of antitrust cases filed 
each year.  The dummy variable for a Democrat President is not significant in 
explaining antitrust case-bringing by the Division in any of the eight 
specifications.  One explanation offered by Powell, Shi, Smith, and Whaley 
(2005) is that presidential dummies can be highly persistent in time series data 
and thus, presidential regime differences can turn out to be insignificant in time 
series analysis.  
 The dummy variables indicating Democratic majorities in the House, 
Senate, and both are positively related to the number of antitrust cases filed.  The 
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Congressional politics result is similar to the findings of Kwoka (1999).  The 
statistical significance of these House, Senate, and Congress coefficients show 
that congressional oversight increases the Antitrust Division’s number of cases 
filed relative to the real GDP by 0.378 percent to 0.586 percent.  Over the 103-
year time period, the average number of cases filed relative to real GDP is 14.03 
cases per trillion dollar of real GDP.  The impact of a Democratic House or 
Senate, evaluated at the mean, is an increase of 5.3 antitrust cases filed per trillion 
dollar of real GDP.  The coefficient for the dummy variable All_Democrat in 
column (7), indicating a Democrat President and Democratic majorities in both 
chambers of Congress, is positive as predicted by theory but is not statistically 
significant. 
 The negative and significant coefficient for the All_Republican dummy 
variable in column (8) indicates that during years when the Republicans control 
the White House and both chambers of Congress, the Division filed 0.599 percent 
less antitrust cases relative to the real GDP.  The impact of this Republican 
control, evaluated at the mean, is a decrease of 8.4 cases filed per trillion dollar of 
real GDP.  This result is similar to Yandle’s (1988) finding.   
   
Table 2.4 - OLS Regressions with Robust Standard Errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: Log of Cases Filed Relative to Real GDP, 1903-2005 
Differenced Log of Real Budget 0.137 0.001 0.077 0.067 0.076 0.004 0.12 -0.03 
 [0.271] [0.245] [0.261] [0.258] [0.257] [0.245] [0.259] [0.293] 
Democrat_President 0.086    -0.065 -0.025   
 [0.127]    [0.108] [0.108]   
Democrat_House  0.545    0.586   
  [0.120]**    [0.171]**   
Democrat_Senate   0.378   -0.043   
   [0.123]**   [0.156]   
Democrat_Congress    0.379 0.404    
    [0.123]** [0.109]**    
All_Democrat       0.178  
       [0.135]  
All_Republican        -0.599 
        [0.160]** 
Time Trend -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.009 
 [0.002]* [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]* [0.002]** 
Constant -3.987 -4.17 -4.112 -4.094 -4.073 -4.156 -4.021 -3.616 
 [0.173]** [0.165]** [0.173]** [0.170]** [0.175]** [0.168]** [0.173]** [0.200]** 
Observations 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 
R-squared 0.07 0.21 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.08 0.19 
Robust standard errors in brackets        
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%               
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 An alternative estimation method to overcome the problem of the 
persistent Democrat presidential dummy variable is to use presidential fixed 
effects or dummy variables for each individual president.  The results are 
presented in Table 2.5 below and none of the presidential dummy variables is 
significant in explaining the Division’s case-bringing behavior. 
 
Table 2.5 - OLS Regressions by Presidential Term and by President  
 (1)   (2) 
Dependent variable: Log of All Cases Filed at the Antitrust Division, 1903-2005 
 
Presidential term 
fixed effect   
Presidential fixed 
effect 
Log of Real Budget 0.338  Log of Real Budget 0.666 
 [0.480]   [0.371] 
Log of Real GDP -1.108  Log of Real GDP 0.642 
 [1.189]   [0.771] 
Taft 0.622  Taft 0.594 
 [0.747]   [0.646] 
Wilson 1st Term -0.094  Wilson -0.184 
 [0.808]   [0.612] 
Wilson 2nd Term -0.044    
 [0.968]    
Harding 0.543  Harding 0.64 
 [1.308]   [0.888] 
Coolidge 0.327  Coolidge 0.172 
 [1.492]   [0.875] 
Hoover -0.713  Hoover -0.518 
 [1.867]   [1.074] 
F.Roosevelt 1st Term -0.917  F.Roosevelt -0.157 
 [2.120]   [1.246] 
F.Roosevelt 2nd Term 0.001    
 [2.254]    
F.Roosevelt 3rd Term 1.164    
 [2.333]    
Truman 1st Term 0.358  Truman -0.74 
 [2.581]   [1.362] 
Truman 2nd Term 0.505    
 [2.715]    
Eisenhower 1st Term 0.273  Eisenhower -0.911 
 [3.057]   [1.637] 
Eisenhower 2nd Term 0.603    
 [3.323]    
Kennedy 0.49  Kennedy -1.024 
 [3.524]   [1.792] 
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Table 2.5 - OLS Regression by Presidential Term and by President (Continued) 
 (1)   (2) 
Dependent variable: Log of All Cases Filed at the Antitrust Division, 1903-2005 
 
Presidential term 
fixed effect   
Presidential fixed 
effect 
Johnson 0.183  Johnson -1.572 
 [3.830]   [1.946] 
Nixon 1st Term 0.225  Nixon -1.821 
 [4.076]   [2.078] 
Nixon 2nd Term 0.059    
 [4.224]    
Ford -0.126  Ford -2.327 
 [4.244]   [2.129] 
Carter -0.389  Carter -2.879 
 [4.349]   [2.170] 
Reagan 1st Term -0.183  Reagan -2.973 
 [4.535]   [2.349] 
Reagan 2nd Term -0.539    
 [4.857]    
G.H.W.Bush -0.509  G.H.W.Bush -3.222 
 [5.106]   [2.544] 
Clinton 1st Term -0.868  Clinton -3.841 
 [5.322]   [2.733] 
Clinton 2nd Term -1.011    
 [5.588]    
G.W.Bush -1.687  G.W.Bush -4.725 
 [5.861]   [2.924] 
Time Trend 0.043  Time Trend -0.015 
 [0.085]   [0.049] 
Constant 7.469  Constant -3.682 
 [7.013]   [4.242] 
Observations 103  Observations 103 
Standard errors in brackets    
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       
 
 Another method to overcome the problem of the persistent Democrat 
presidential dummy variable is to use dummy variables for the year when the 
effect of a new president would be most pronounced.  It is unlikely that a multi-
term Democratic president such as Franklin D. Roosevelt could have affected the 
conduct of antitrust policy for all twelve years he was in office.  It is more 
reasonable to think that a major antitrust reforms or change resulting from 
campaign promises would occur in the first or second year of a newly elected 
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president’s term in office.  Thus, I construct dummy variables for the first year, 
second year, and first two years of a president’s administration.  None of these 
dummy variables, however, turn out to be statistically significant suggesting that 
the first two years of a new president’s administration do not affect the number of 
antitrust cases filed by the Division. 
 I also partition the data into three distinct time periods to reflect the major 
changes in antitrust policy in the country.  The first period from 1903 to 1914 
encompasses the Division’s status is the sole enforcer of antitrust laws in this 
country.  In other words, the Division is a monopolist supplying antitrust cases.  
The second period from 1915 to 1948 includes years of competition between the 
Division and its sister agency, the FTC.  Finally, 1948 marks the beginning of a 
liaison agreement and a period of cooperation between the Division and the FTC.  
These two agencies currently allocated antitrust cases based on their different 
areas of expertise.  Partitioning the data into these three periods and including 
political dummy variables do not show any statistically significant result.  Neither 
does using period dummy variables along with the political dummy variables.  I 
conclude that the pattern of antitrust enforcement over time is not related to these 
three time periods. 
 In a robust time series specification, I use the first-differenced of the 
logged data to estimate the effect of political party affiliations on the Division’s 
caseload, controlling for the size of the economy and the Division’s budget.  The 
result of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root shows that the first-
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differenced of these logged time series are stationary.  The first-difference of logs 
regression equation is as follows: 
(3) Diff_ln(casest-(t-1))= β0 + β1Diff_ln(budgett-(t-1)) + β2Diff_ln(GDPt-(t-1))  
     + β3Democrattk + εt 
for t = 1903 to 2005 and in different model specifications, for k = Democrat 
President, Democrat House, Democrat Senate, Democrat Congress 
(House*Senate) and All Republican (President, House and Senate).   
 In Table 2.6’s the first-differenced regression, none of the political 
variables is statistically significant, leading me to conclude that presidential 
control and congressional oversight do not affect bureaucratic behavior at the 
Division.  The results show that the Antitrust Division is a bureaucratic agency 
that goes about its business and is insulated from political pressure.  The behavior 
of Division bureaucrats is driven by its internal dynamics and incentives 
(Katzmann 1980 and Weaver 1977), which I am unable to study directly in this 
paper.  Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that Division bureaucrats are 
largely independent of presidential and congressional politics.  This result makes 
intuitive sense if we consider that the rank and file bureaucrats, not the politically-
appointed Division head, are the ones who carry out the Division’s daily business 
of case selection, investigations, and litigation. 
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Table 2.6 – First-Differenced OLS Regressions with Robust Standard Errors 
                  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable: Differenced Log of Cases Filed at the Antitrust Division, 1903-2005 
Differenced Log Real Budget -0.056 -0.05 -0.062 -0.054 -0.054 -0.043 -0.047 -0.06 
 [0.312] [0.309] [0.312] [0.309] [0.311] [0.315] [0.310] [0.313] 
Differenced Log Real GDP -1.398 -1.346 -1.454 -1.371 -1.378 -1.343 -1.258 -1.42 
 [1.346] [1.260] [1.318] [1.253] [1.327] [1.342] [1.255] [1.349] 
Democrat_President 0    0.005 -0.026   
 [0.121]    [0.133] [0.110]   
Democrat_House  -0.026    -0.124   
  [0.127]    [0.267]   
Democrat_Senate   0.029   0.131   
   [0.118]   [0.247]   
Democrat_Congress    -0.014 -0.015    
    [0.111] [0.123]    
All_Democrat       -0.061  
       [0.108]  
All_Republican        -0.013 
        [0.158] 
Constant 0.08 0.094 0.066 0.087 0.085 0.092 0.096 0.084 
 [0.079] [0.125] [0.099] [0.110] [0.105] [0.122] [0.087] [0.093] 
Observations 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Robust standard errors in brackets        
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%        
NB: Adding a time trend does not change the signs and magnitudes of the estimates very much.     
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 I also estimate an alternative model that takes into account the two-step 
process involved in congressional budget appropriations and bureaucratic case-
bringing decision.  Each year, the Division submits a budget proposal to 
congressional appropriations committees that are based on its previous year’s 
budget request.  Then, congressional politicians on the appropriations committee 
determine the Division’s budget for the upcoming year based on its budget and 
caseload in the previous year.  The previous year’s caseload is a “visible” measure 
used by politicians to determine the Division’s productivity and output.  Once the 
budget is appropriated, Division bureaucrats make decisions about which cases 
and how many cases to pursue.  Thus, I first estimate the Division’s budget (with 
only House and Senate dummies because they are the ones who decide the 
budget) and predict the budget residuals.  These predicted budget residuals are the 
unexplained part of the budget regression that is not related to congressional 
politics, the previous year’s budget and caseload.  Then, I include the budget 
residuals in the second-step estimation of the Division’s caseload to see if the 
presidential dummy variable can explain the bureaucrat’s case-selection decision. 
This two-step procedure to predict budget residuals that are purged of the 
congressional oversight effect is also used in Weingast and Moran (1987).  The 
first-step regression equation is as follows: 
(4) Diff_ln(Budgett)= β0 + β1Diff_ln(Budgett-1) + β2Diff_ln(Casest-1)  
    + β3Diff_ln(GDPt-1) + β4Democrat_Houset  
    + β4Democrat_Senatet + εt 
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for t = 1903 to 2005.  After the first-step regressions, I predict Budget_Residualt 
and include it in the second-step regression as follows: 
(5)  Diff_ln(Casest)= γ0 + γ1(Budget_Residualt) + γ2Democrat_Presidentt + δt.. 
 Table 2.7 presents the results from the above two-step regression.  The 
first two columns include a linear time trend, while the third and fourth columns 
do not include a time trend.  The exclusion of the linear time trend changes the 
sign and magnitude of the lagged differenced log of real budget and real GDP.  
However, none of the estimated coefficients are significant in this specification.  
These results lead me to conclude that congressional oversight does not affect the 
Division’s budget appropriation process and presidential party control does not 
influence the Division’s case selection decisions.  In this econometric 
specification, I do not find any support for the hypotheses of presidential party 
control and congressional oversight.  My results fail to reject the null hypothesis 
of an independent bureaucracy at the Antitrust Division. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 69
Table 2.7 - Two-Step Budget and Caseload OLS Regressions with Robust Standard Errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variables: 
Difference
d Log
of Real 
Budget 
Difference
d Log 
of Cases 
Filed 
Difference
d Log  
of Real 
Budget 
Difference
d Log 
of Cases 
Filed 
Lagged Differenced Log of Real Budget -0.31  0.084  
 [0.191]  [0.622]  
Lagged Differenced Log of Cases Filed -0.024  -0.025  
 [0.067]  [0.065]  
Lagged Differenced Log of Real GDP 0.084  -0.31  
 [0.626]  [0.191]  
Democrat_House 0.122  0.122  
 [0.064]  [0.068]  
Democrat_Senate 0.004  0.004  
 [0.064]  [0.062]  
Time Trend 0 -0.002   
 [0.001] [0.002]   
Predicted Budget Residuals  -0.026  -0.027 
  [0.343]  [0.346] 
Democrat_President  -0.052  -0.048 
  [0.113]  [0.112] 
Constant 0.05 0.161 0.05 0.06 
 [0.108] [0.169] [0.066] [0.066] 
Observations 101 101 101 101 
R-squared 0.13 0.01 0.13 0 
Robust standard errors in brackets     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 This paper explores the relationship between the executive and legislative 
branches’ political affiliations and antitrust enforcement activities.  I present a 
demand and supply framework for antitrust cases that is based on Peltzman’s 
(1976) model of the market for regulation.  The demanders of antitrust cases are 
elected U.S. Representatives and Senators who sit on congressional 
appropriations committees, while the suppliers of antitrust cases are Division 
bureaucrats appointed by the President.  This demand and supply model results in 
an equilibrium budget and number of cases that are observed each year.  These 
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equilibrium budget and caseload data can be influenced by political variables such 
as the party affiliation of the president, majority party in the House and Senate, 
and whether the White House and both chambers of Congress are controlled by 
the same party.   
 I cite previous studies that have found significant results for presidential 
party control, individual president’s effect, and congressional oversight.  These 
studies, however, did not take into account the nonstationarity of the time series 
data and the time persistence of the binary presidential dummy variable.  The 
nonstationarity of the data will result in spurious t-statistics.  I employ time-series 
econometric analysis that corrects for the nonstationarity of these time series data 
by using a first-differencing technique.  After this correction of the data, the 
statistical significance of the political variables disappears.  Thus, I fail to support 
the hypotheses of presidential party control and congressional oversight in time-
series regression analyses examining the relationship between political variables 
and the Division’s antitrust activities.  My findings support the hypothesis of an 
independent bureaucracy at the Antitrust Division. 
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RELATIVE PRICES AND FAMILY VALUES: AN APPLICATION 
DURING WORLD WAR II1 
 
 
I. Introduction 
  “Black women have been handicapped by the increasing shortage  
  of marriageable Black men.” 
       - Lynn Norment (1992) 
 The basic tenet of price theory is that relative prices matter.  We explore 
this economic tenet in abstract settings such as the market for human sexual 
relations and marriage.  In particular, we analyze the question of whether the 
exodus of young white males to fight in World War II affected the price of sexual 
relations.  Since most sex acts are transacted in non-market settings without quid 
pro quo exchanges, we can only look at an instrument, namely illegitimate births.  
We show that the reduction in the number of available sex partners for women 
during the war reduced the price that remaining men had to pay for sex.  One 
result of this lower price is an increase in the number of children born without 
married parents.2  We draw further corollaries regarding the relative scarcity of 
men during this period by examining the differences in age, education attainment, 
                                                 
1 This essay is coauthored with Robert E. McCormick of Clemson University and Mason S. 
Gerety of Northern Arizona University.  We thank Eric Bertonazzi and Jody Lipford for their help 
in earlier drafts of this paper.  The usual caveat applies. 
 
2 Posner (1994) defines the effective sex ratio as “the ratio of males to available females.” (p. 136) 
High effective sex ratios lead to more homosexual contacts and the use of prostitutes.  Low 
effective sex ratios lead to an increase in illegitimate births.  Posner focuses on urban black 
America for his supporting evidence, and claims that because the effective sex ratio for urban 
blacks is so low, “that with so favorable an effective sex ratio, black men (outside of prison) will 
be less likely than white men to engage in opportunistic homosexual behavior or patronize 
prostitutes but are more likely to have multiple sex partners, to be initiated into sex early, and to 
father illegitimate children.” (p. 138). 
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and income between couples that married during the war.  Large disparities in 
age, education, and income indicate that women are marrying less suitable men 
who are beneath their socioeconomic class. 
 The idea that the balance between the number of men and women in a 
society may be an important determinant of social mores and relationships is not 
new to either the sociology or cultural anthropology literature (Norment 1992).  A 
psychologist, Harriette McAdoo, reports that there are between 35 to 45 black 
men available for every 100 black women, that is single men who are employed, 
out of jail, and non drug users.  She also claims that for wealthy black women the 
ratio is even more lopsided, one per hundred.  Aborampah (1989) discusses the 
effect of this low sex ratio on black women where “the low sex ratio puts black 
women at a disadvantage in mate selection.  As a result of the black male 
shortage, there is intense competition for the available few.”  Staples (1978, 65) 
argues “to bargain effectively, the black woman must use the enticement of sex … 
Given the abundance of women around, he [the black male] does not have to wait 
too long, and her alternatives are limited because of the shortage of men.”  Again, 
Braithwaite (1981) claims that, “the insufficient supply of Black men pits Black 
women against each other in competition for the attention of this scarce resource.”  
Guttentag and Secord (1983) find empirical evidence to support the assertion that 
this competition for men will lead to more illegitimate births.  Using cross-
sectional data from the National Center for Health Statistics, they find a strong 
negative correlation between the sex ratios for nonwhites and the proportion of 
nonwhite live births that were illegitimate [-0.76 in 1960 and -0.75 in 1970]. They 
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conclude that “there seems little doubt that sex ratios and illegitimacy are … very 
strongly correlated.” 
 While these assertions and discussions are illuminating, they do not 
provide a controlled experimental setting.  We wish to examine how the radical 
and unexpected changes in the sex ratio of males to females impact the incidence 
of illegitimate births.  To accomplish this, we examine the American World War 
II experience, and confine our discussion to whites.  The next section will present 
a model that allows for the changes in the sex ratio to affect the patterns of 
illegitimacy.  We also present evidence about the types of matches that occur 
during periods of male scarcity.  
 
II. A Model of Sexual Relations 
 We adopt a demand and supply framework to determine the “price” and 
quantity of matches that occur.  In this non-market setting, the “price” is defined 
as some combination of marriage and fidelity promises, legal obligations from 
marriage, and wealth transfers–either pre- or post-marriage–from a male to a 
female.  In Figure 3.1, the N number of males are arrayed according to the 
intensity of their demand for sex (or their willingness to pay for sex) along the 
demand curve DM0.  The men are rank-ordered from left to right or highest 
demand intensity to lowest demand intensity.  Similarly, there are N females in 
this population and they are also arrayed, from left to right, according to their 
intensity of demand for sex along the demand curve DF0.  In a world where males 
and females are identical, except for their varying demand intensity for sex, the 
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male demand curve DM0 is exactly the same as the female demand curve DF0 and 
every male and female would be matched.  In fact, sexual matches occur at every 
point along the demand curve.  There are N matched couples in this world and no 
males or females remain unmatched.   
 
 
 
 We observe, however, that females bear an expected cost “t” of possible 
pregnancy, which decreases their demand intensity for sex by the amount “t”.  
The cost “t” includes the health risk of bearing a child and the time and monetary 
expense involved in raising a child.  Thus, the females’ demand curve for sexual 
relations is shifted down by “t” and results in the new curve DF1.  Note that N-NF 
women have a negative valuation for sexual relations.  In fact, these women must 
be compensated in order to induce them to match with a man.  The females who 
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have smaller negative demand intensity for sex, are closer to the point NF and they 
require less compensation than females who have large negative demand intensity 
for sex (those who are closer to the point N).  The N-th female in this population, 
the one with the lowest demand intensity for sex, would demand the entire 
amount “t” as payment for matching with a male.  The females who possess 
negative demand values for sex will match themselves to a male if he is willing to 
pay a “price”–like marriage, gifts, and monetary support–for them.  These low sex 
drive females have become “suppliers” arrayed along the supply curve SF0.  This 
supply curve is obtained by pivoting the negative portion of female demand 
curve, from NF to DF1, to become SF0.  Both SF0 and DF1 share the same horizontal 
intercept, NF, and have the same slope (but with different signs, of course).  
 The equilibrium number of N* matches occurs where the new supply 
curve SF0 intersects the male demand curve DM0.  The resulting price, Psex, is the 
wealth transfer–marriage obligations, gifts, and monetary support–extracted by all 
married women.  Since a man cannot differentiate between high demand intensity 
women and low demand intensity women, he has to pay the price of Psex to the 
woman that he marries.  Thus, the high demand intensity females are price-
protected by the low demand intensity females.  There are, however, 2(N–N*) 
men and women who do not match with a spouse. 
 This framework is useful to analyze our question of relative price because 
a decrease in the effective sex ratio can be modeled as a downward shift in the 
men’s demand curve, shown in Figure 3.2 below.  The exodus of men to fight in 
World War II shifted the males’ demand curve for sex from DM0 to DM1.  Due to 
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the relative scarcity of men, the remaining males pay a lower price, new Psex, to 
their spouses.  Also note that there are fewer couples, N**, who are matched after 
the exodus of soldiers sent to fight abroad.   
 
 
 
 The new Psex could be interpreted as a smaller wealth transfer that is 
extracted by the married females or the lack of a marriage bond prior to sexual 
relations.  Females, who previously could expect a legal marriage contract from a 
man before engaging in sex, now have to accept a lower “price” for sexual 
relations.  The relative scarcity of men induce women into competition for the 
remaining available men, including sexual competition where women would have 
sex with men without the benefit of marriage and without the use of birth control, 
thus resulting in illegitimate births.  This situation describes an equilibrium where 
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the increased level of illegitimate births is determined by the decrease in the sex 
ratio.  
 Another implication from this model predicts the resulting matches as 
being different from the pre-War norm, that is, women are marrying less suitable 
men.  The traditional ideal of male-female coupling suggests that women prefer to 
marry men who are a couple of years older than them, men who had more years 
of education than them, and men who earn higher wages than them.  The matches 
that occurred during this period of male scarcity may include couples who are 
very different from each other or from different socioeconomic classes.  For 
instance, a woman may have resorted to marrying a man who is much older or 
younger than her, a man who has considerably less education than her, or a man 
who makes less money than she does.  The next section describes our data sources 
and provides some econometric evidence for the predictions of the model. 
 
III. The Data and Some Evidence 
 In this section, we collect census data to directly test the prediction of the 
model regarding the effect of the change in the sex ratio on the illegitimate birth 
rate.  In order to compute the sex ratio during the war, we start with the number of 
males and the number of females in each state as counted by the 1940 census.  
Then, we subtract from the male population in each month, the number of draftees 
called by the Selective Service, starting in December 1940.  We then recomputed 
the sex ratio using the revised number of males relative to the number of females.  
At the end of the war, we allow the surviving males to return.  Table 3.1 shows 
 80
the sex ratio for the United States (averaged for 42 states in our data set) for the 
period 1940-1945, except 1942.  The highest ratio of men to women over this 
period occurs in Nevada in 1941 and the lowest ratio is found in the District of 
Columbia in 1945.  The national sex ratio decreased dramatically throughout the 
war period, resulting in the lowest sex ratio in 1945 where there were only 80.9 
males per 100 females in the country. 
 
Table 3.1 - U.S. Average Male-Female Population Ratio for 42 States 
Year Male-Female Ratio (Computed)     
1940 0.95   
1941 0.895   
1943 0.848   
1944 0.824   
1945 0.809     
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
 
 As predicted by our model, the decrease in the sex ratio is accompanied by 
a sharp increase in the illegitimate birth rate from 1943 to 1945, as depicted in 
Figure 3.3 below.  We are unable to obtain data for 1942.  The downward trend 
present prior to the war reverses itself during the war and appears to return to 
long-run trend levels after the war.  The U.S. average (for whites) illegitimate 
birth rate over the war period is 19.3 per 1000 live births.  The lowest incidence is 
found in Utah in 1943 at 6.1 and the highest is observed in Maine in 1945 at 50.5. 
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 We also present some econometric evidence for the relationship between 
the sex ratio and the illegitimate birth rate.  The summary statistics of the data are 
presented in Table 3.2 below.  Recall that we have data on 156 state-year 
observations that spans 1941-1945 (except 1942) and includes 42 states.3  The 
dependent variable of interest is each state’s illegitimate births per 1000 live 
births.  We include the illegitimate birth rate in 1935 as a baseline control 
variable.  We also control for each state’s income per capita, median years of 
school, population density, four-firm church concentration ratio and church 
membership in 1950.  The independent variable of interest is the sex ratio or the 
male to female ratio, either contemporaneous with the illegitimate births data or 
                                                 
3 We only have one year’s observation for Colorado, Connecticut, and New Mexico and 3 years’ 
observations for Arizona, Idaho, and Nevada.  The nine states not included in our data set are 
Alaska, California, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, and 
Wyoming. 
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lagged by one year.  We lag the sex ratio by one year because any change in the 
price of sexual relations (especially out of wedlock sex) will only manifest itself 
after a nine-month gestation period.   
 
Table 3.2 - Summary Statistics for 42 States During 1941-1945 (Except 1942)   
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Illegitimate Birth Rate in 1935 156 19.89 6.67 8.53 41.42 
Illegitimate Births per 1000 Live Births 156 19.29 8.15 6.10 50.50 
Income per Capita 156 540.23 187.10 242 1066 
Median Years of Schooling 156 8.91 0.82 7.8 12.1 
Population Density 156 194.97 749.76 0.94 4743.26 
Military Draftees 156 30540.25 42041.11 1050 340012 
Male/Female Ratio (contemporaneous) 156 0.93 0.08 0.76 1.24 
Male/Female Ratio (lagged one year) 156 0.95 0.08 0.77 1.26 
4-Firm Church Concentration Ratio 156 75.60 10.13 51.70 96.60 
Church Membership in 1950 156 47.02 11.37 27.70 75.70 
Percent Protestant in 1950 156 30.13 10.09 13.80 68.80 
Percent Catholic in 1950 156 15.52 12.79 0.60 58.90 
Percent Jewish in 1950 156 1.21 1.57 0 7.50 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau and U.S. Vital Statistics 
 
We use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the following illegitimate 
births regression equation: 
(1) Illegitimate birthsjt = β0 + β1(Illegitimate births in 1935)j + β2(Median  
    years of schooling)j + β3(Income per capita)j  
    + β4(Population density)j + β5(Male-female ratio)jt  
    + β6(4-firm church concentration ratio)j + β7(Church 
    membership in 1950)j + β8(Year dummies)t  
    + β9(State dummies)j + εjt 
for j = 42 states and t = 1941, 1943, 1944, and 1945.  Note that we use two 
different measures of the male-female ratio: contemporaneous and lagged by one 
year.   
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Table 3.3 - OLS Regressions for 42 States During 1941-1945 (Except 1942) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Illegitimate Births per 1000 Live Births 
Male/Female Ratio (contemporaneous) -12.813  -18.306  
 [4.713]**  [5.402]**  
Male/Female Ratio (lagged one year)  -19.587  -29.876 
  [5.057]**  [5.520]** 
Illegitimate Birth Rate in 1935 1.109 1.104 1.175 1.178 
 [0.074]** [0.071]** [0.096]** [0.084]** 
Median Years of Schooling 1.955 2.198 3.043 3.636 
 [0.805]* [0.782]** [1.098]** [0.963]** 
Income per Capita -0.008 -0.007 -0.001 0.003 
 [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.005] [0.004] 
Population Density 0.0006 0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0024 
 [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0011] [0.0010]* 
4-Firm Church Concentration Ratio -0.132 -0.137 -0.151 -0.141 
 [0.038]** [0.037]** [0.054]** [0.048]** 
Church Membership in 1950 0.072 0.07 -0.021 -0.076 
 [0.031]* [0.032]* [0.046] [0.041] 
Constant 2.199 7.498 -0.349 6.226 
 [7.507] [7.359] [9.519] [8.070] 
State fixed effects? No No Yes Yes 
Observations 156 156 156 156 
R-squared 0.78 0.8 0.86 0.88 
Robust standard errors in brackets     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         
 
 The illegitimate births regression results are presented in Table 3.3.  In 
columns (1) and (2) the independent variable of interest, the lagged and 
contemporaneous male-female ratio, is negative and statistically significant in 
explaining illegitimate birth rates during the war.  A 10 percent decrease in the 
sex ratio (a reduction of 10 males per 100 females in the population) in a given 
year will result in an increase of 1.96 illegitimate births per 1000 live births in the 
following year.  While a 10 percent decrease in the contemporaneous sex ratio 
will result in an increase of 1.28 illegitimate births per 1000 live births.  We add 
state dummy variables in columns (3) and (4) to control for unobservable state-
specific effects that could influence the illegitimate birth rate in each state.  We 
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obtain larger positive and statistically significant coefficients for the 
contemporaneous and lagged sex ratio variables, indicating that the variation in 
the sex ratio is an important explanatory variable for the changes in the 
illegitimate birth rate during this period. 
In all four specifications in Table 3.3, the baseline illegitimate birth rate in 
1935 is positive and statistically significant in explaining the illegitimate birth rate 
during the war years.  These positive coefficients show that the illegitimate birth 
rate during World War II was higher than in 1935. The coefficient for median 
years of schooling is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that states 
with better educated populations have higher illegitimate birth rates during the 
war.  The median level of education in a state may be correlated with the levels of 
tolerance within a state.  For instance, states with higher median years of 
schooling tend to be in the West and Northeast (morally liberal states), while 
states with lower median years of schooling tend to be in the South (morally 
conservative states where the social censure of illegitimacy is more severe).4  
Higher income states tend to have lower incidences of illegitimate births during 
the war.  Population density, however, does not significantly affect the 
illegitimate birth rate in the states.  The four-firm church concentration ratio, 
which measures the total market share (in terms of adherents) of the four largest 
religious institutions in each state, is negative and significant in explaining 
illegitimate birth rates during the war.  States with a high religious concentration 
                                                 
4 The top ten states with the highest median years of schooling are the District of Columbia, Utah, 
Nevada, Washington, Oregon, Maine, Arizona, Florida, Colorado, and Texas.  The bottom ten 
states with the lowest median years of schooling are Kentucky, West Virginia, Tennessee, 
Arkansas, North Carolina, Alabama, Louisiana, New Mexico, Virginia, and Georgia. 
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ratio (such as Utah, with 96.6% of the population belonging to the four largest 
religious establishments within the state) may have a lower tolerance for 
illegitimacy.  
 The results in Table 3.3 suggest that the sharp decrease in the male-female 
population ratio increased the bargaining power of males relative to females.  
Thus, the remaining males do not have to pay as high a “price” to couple with 
females during the war and the decrease in the “price” of sexual relations resulted 
in increased births out of wedlock. 
 The decrease in the sex ratio also implies a corollary in the marriage 
market where women became willing to marry less suitable men.  The women 
who married during the war may have husbands who are a lot older than them or 
younger.  The husbands may also have less education, and a lower-paying job.  In 
order to test these corollaries, we obtained data on 9,968 married couples from the 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples (IPUMS) database.  These couples were 
married during the period 1936 to 1950.  The demographic and economic 
information for these couples are observed during census years 1940, 1950, and 
1960.  The year of marriage and age at marriage are invariant with respect to time, 
but the data on education, occupation, and income are recorded with respect to the 
census year observed.  See Table 3.4 for the differences between married couples 
in terms of their marriage ages, real incomes, real wages, occupational income 
score, socioeconomic index, and years of education.5  These couples are listed by 
their year of marriage. 
                                                 
5 The IPUMS’s Duncan socioeconomic index is a measure of occupational status based upon the 
income level and educational attainment associated with each occupation in 1950. 
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In Table 3.5, we perform a difference-in-difference analysis of these 9,968 
married couples in order to detect any changes in their ages at marriage and their 
economic status.  The married couples are grouped in five-year intervals 
according to their year of marriage: period 1 for the pre-war years (1936-1940), 
period 2 for the war years (1941-1945), and period 3 for the post-war years (1946-
1950).  The average difference in age at marriage for the period before the war 
and the period during the war is -0.22 years for men and 0.11 years for women.  
Women who married during the war were, on average, older than women who 
married before or after the war, and these women married men who were, on 
average, younger than the men who married before the war.  The net difference 
between male and female age at marriage between these two periods is -0.33 
years, more than twice the -0.14 years net difference between the war period and 
post-war period.  According to a t-test for means, these two numbers are 
statistically different from one another at the one percent level of significance. 
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We also observe statistically significant differences between married 
males and married females in the pre-, during, and post-war periods for the four 
economic variables and the education variable listed in Table 3.5.  According to 
the net difference in real income and real wage, married males earned 
significantly more money than their wives, for pre-war and during war period, but 
these differences narrowed sharply after the war.  
 The increase in years of education before the war and during the war is 
0.63 years for men and 0.52 years for women, resulting in a net difference of 0.11 
years of education between married men and married women between these two 
periods.  These increases in years of education slowed down after the war, such 
that the average married female has become better educated than her husband by a 
net difference of -0.04 years. 
 Another corollary predicted by our model is about the suitability of the 
spouses that married during the war.  Our model predicts that women want to 
marry men who are similar in age to them, have not been previously married, are 
of the same race and birthplaces as their wives, have higher if not equal 
educational attainment, economic standing, and earning power compared to their 
wives.  During the period of male scarcity, women are more likely to match up 
with the remaining available men, despite their age, previous marital status, race, 
birthplace, educational attainment, socioeconomic standing, and income.     
To test the statistical significance of the corollary predicted by our model, 
we estimate the following system of eleven equations by Zellner’s (1962) 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method.  The married male-female 
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differences in age, education, and income are highly collinear with each other, 
thus inflating the standard errors from the OLS regression and consequently, 
deflating the t-statistics of the estimates.  The problem with including highly 
collinear explanatory variables in a single regression is the difficulty in 
interpreting how much of the dependent variable’s variance is explained by each 
of the correlated independent variables.  The SUR technique allows for the 
estimation of a system of equations with correlated error terms between equations.  
The eleven equations to be estimated are the differences between married couples 
(defined as the husband’s variable minus his wife’s variable), each explained by 
the state’s male-female sex ratio and state fixed-effects. 
(2) (Married male-female differences k)i = δ0 + δ1(Sex ratio)jt  
      + δ2(State dummies)j + γi 
for i = 7,797 couples observed at census years 1940, 1950, or 1960; t = year of 
marriage from 1937 to 1950 (1936 is the omitted year); and j = 50 states 
(Alabama is the omitted category).  The subscript k indexes the eleven equations 
with the following dependent variables: both married previously binary variable, 
husband previously married binary variable, wife previously married binary 
variable, different races binary variable, different birth place binary variable, 
difference in years of education, difference in socioeconomic index, difference in 
occupational income score, difference in real (1960 constant dollars) income, and 
difference in real (1960 constant dollars) wage.   
It should be noted that our data set is not a panel structure.  We do not 
observe the same couples in all three census years of 1940, 1950, and 1960.  
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These observations are stacked cross sections from the IPUMS’s 1% census 
samples for 1940, 1950, and 1960.  We originally have 9,968 couples in our 
sample, but only 7,797 of them had complete educational information for our 
analysis.  Our sample size is further reduced to 3,197 couples when we include 
the contemporaneous male-female ratio for each state and each year.  To control 
for the 9-month gestation period of a pregnancy (our outcome variable of 
interest), we use lagged male-female ratios for each state and lagged year, 
resulting in a regression with 2,812 couples. 
 Table 6 presents the results for the SUR estimates of equation (2).  Panel 
A uses the contemporaneous sex ratio in the state that an individual couple 
resides.  Panel B uses the previous year’s sex ratio in the state that an individual 
couple resides.  A priori, as the sex ratio decreases due to the exodus of men 
fighting in the war, we ought to see more women marry less suitable men who are 
older, who may have been previously married, who may be of a different race or 
birthplace.  These less desirable men may have less education than their spouses 
or earn less money than their spouses.  Since the dependent variables in columns 
(7) through (11) are in terms of the male-female difference, we expect to see 
positive coefficients to denote a direct relationship between the state’s sex ratio 
decreasing during the war and the accompanying smaller income differences 
between married men and their spouses.  For the previous marital status, race and 
birthplace binary variables in columns (2) through (6), we expect to see negative 
coefficients to describe the inverse relationship between the state’s sex ratio 
decreasing during the war and the accompanying increases in marriages for men 
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who have been previously married, interracial marriages, and marriages between 
people born in different states. 
Out of the eleven equations estimated in Panel A, there are only three 
statistically significant differences in columns (4), (6), and (11).  In column (4), 
the decrease in the sex ratio during the war increases the incidence of marriages 
between women who have been previously married and men who are married 
once.  The result in column (6) is consistent with our model’s prediction that the 
decrease in each state’s sex ratio during the war increases the number of women 
who married men born in states different from their wives.  This is not a 
conclusive result as some differences are not as striking as others.  For example, 
the difference in the birthplace of North Carolina for the husband versus South 
Carolina for the wife is not as remarkable the difference in the birthplace of 
Wyoming for the husband versus Alabama for the wife.  Even then, the birthplace 
may not be indicative of the state where each individual grew up.  In column (11), 
the statistically significant but negative coefficient on the difference in real wages 
between married men and their spouses during the war indicate that a decrease in 
the sex ratio increased women’s real wages relative to their husbands’ and 
resulted in a smaller wage differential.  This is certainly true if we consider the 
influx of women into the labor market during the war and the increase in women’s 
wages (compared to their previous unpaid status as a homemaker). 
 In Panel B’s SUR estimates using each state’s lagged sex ratio, there are 
only two statistically significant differences in column (15) and (16).  The 
negative coefficient on previously married wives is similar to the result in column 
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(4) of Panel A.  The positive coefficient on interracial marriages is not compatible 
with our model’s prediction.  We expect to see more interracial marriages during 
the war, for instance between white women and non-white men.  However, the 
coefficient suggests that a decrease in a state’s sex ratio also decreased the 
incidence of interracial marriages.  There are only 34 interracial couples in our 
IPUMS dataset of 9,969 married couples.  The minuscule percentage of interracial 
marriages during the 1936 to 1950 time period suggests that interracial marriages 
are quite uncommon and perhaps not socially acceptable.  Thus, we must interpret 
with care the statistically significant coefficient on interracial marriages in Table 
3.6. 
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IV. Alternative Explanations    
 The argument may be made that the observed increase in the illegitimate 
birthrate is due to alternative phenomena.  In this section we address the 
possibility of what we loosely call the horizon problem.  One dimension in which 
people pay for behavior is the opportunity cost of time.  When one's expected 
time horizon is short, costly behavior becomes relatively less expensive.  An 
extreme example is that of war.  Just as Vietnam era veterans consumed more 
heroin during their tour of duty than they did before or after their service, so too 
may be the case among wartime women consuming more illegitimate sex, with its 
accompanying consequences.  The social stigma of the bastard child is 
conceivably less severe during war.  The whispers of the neighbors pale in 
comparison to the wrath of the Blitzkrieg.  We therefore have an alternative 
hypothesis with testable implications. 
 If there indeed existed genuine fear as to the future of the United States, 
then under the time horizon hypothesis we would expect various other time-
dependant series to be affected.  Foremost, in the case of world war, one would 
expect observed interest rates to reflect a sudden shift in time preferences.  
Moreover, one cannot imagine a steeper yield curve than one in which both the 
issuer and holders of long-term debt may not exist in the near future.  We 
therefore obtained data on short and long rates during the WWII period.  
Unfortunately, interest rates were controlled by the Federal Government during 
most of this period.  For example, from the middle of 1943 through 1947, the rate 
on three-month T-bills was pegged at 0.375 percent.  Indeed most other rates were 
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virtually constant during this period.  Thus we see no real chance to test the theory 
on this margin. 
 In a second attempt, we looked at life insurance policies.  Again, the same 
reasoning applies.  A casual interpretation of the data show a steady increase in 
the number of policies in force and coverage per family when in fact the theory 
predicts a decline.  When your world may be coming to an end, there is little 
reason to pay for a policy that none of your loved ones can collect on.  What is 
especially interesting about these data is that they relate only to what is referred to 
as legal reserve life insurance companies.  These are companies operating under 
insurance laws specifying the minimum basis for the reserves a company must 
maintain on its policies.  Veterans life insurance policies issued by the federal 
government to members of the Armed Forces during this period are not included.  
Therefore the rise in policies cannot be attributed to the millions of military 
personnel at high risk of dying.  We suggest a possible interpretation of these data 
is that indeed the horizon problem was not substantial.  In fact, the simultaneous 
rise in the number of policies and fall in the average size of policies, we suggest, 
may be a result of more, not fewer, less wealthy (relative to men) women 
purchasing policies.  Thus this interpretation is not consistent with the horizon 
problem theory. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 The issue of illegitimate births is serious.  This problem is particularly 
keen among black American.  Men are net demanders of sexual activity.  While 
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both men and women enjoy the physical act of sexual contact and relations, 
women bear a larger expected cost and are therefore, net suppliers.  Women 
negotiate for the supply of sex via a commitment from men to assist in the rearing 
of any issue that might ensue from a random sex act.  Women shift part of the cost 
of pregnancy to men by requiring a long-run commitment in order to supply their 
portion of the sex act.  Competition between women for a shrinking number of 
men erases the ability of many women to sustain the commitment demand.  The 
result is an increasing number of sex acts outside the bounds of marriage or a 
commitment to marriage.  When the number of men relative to the number of 
women decreases, the prices tilt in favor of men, and they are less regularly 
required to make the long-term commitment of marriage in order to enjoy regular 
sexual relations.  When females are plentiful, competition between women 
reduces the request on their part that the man make a long-term commitment.  
This problem has the potential for social degeneration and moral decay.  To 
recapitulate, we find some evidence that the sex ratio affects the price of sexual 
relations, namely the number of illegitimate births.  We also find some suggestive 
evidence that the decrease in the sex ratio affects the married male-female 
differences in terms of age, previous marital status, education, and socioeconomic 
standing. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 The first essay of my dissertation presents a two-sector model of land use 
in a county for the purpose of analyzing the effect of conservation easements on 
local property tax revenues.  I assume that the tax deductibility of conservation 
easements increases the demand for agricultural land.  In instances when local 
property tax revenues decline due to the income tax deductibility of conservation 
easements, the decline depends, ceteris paribus, on the following four conditions.  
First, the decline is larger when the demand for land is more elastic.  Second, the 
decline is larger when the proportion of non-agricultural land in the county is 
larger. Third, the decline is larger when the agricultural tax benefit is larger.  
Counties that have a large difference between the property tax rate on non-
agricultural land and the property tax rate on agricultural land will experience a 
decrease in their property tax revenues.   Fourth, the decline is larger when there 
is less Ricardian rent on agricultural land or a lower cost for farming closer to the 
city center. 
 In the second essay of my dissertation, I examine the role of presidential 
party control and congressional oversight on the pattern of antitrust enforcement 
by the Antitrust Division from 1903 to 2005.  In one econometric specification, I 
find some evidence congruent with my model’s prediction that Democratic 
majorities in the House and the Senate increase the number of antitrust cases filed.  
Individual presidents and the president’s political party, however, cannot explain 
the Division’s caseload over this time period.  Additionally, in a first-differenced 
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time series specification, none of the political variables is statistically significant.  
Thus, I am unable to reject the hypotheses of bureaucratic discretion.  The rank 
and file bureaucrats at the Division are the ones conducting the Division’s daily 
business and they are largely independent of political pressure from the White 
House and the Congress. 
 My third essay analyzes the effect of a change in the sex ratio of males to 
females on the price of sexual relations as measured by an instrument, namely 
illegitimate births.  The deployment of young men to fight overseas during World 
War II resulted in a dramatic decrease in the sex ratio.  The reduction in the 
number of available sex partners for women during the war decreased the price 
that the remaining men had to pay for sex.  One result of this lower price is the 
increase in the number of children born out of wedlock during the war.  State-
level data from 1941 to 1945 (except 1942 where no data are available) show that 
the decline in the sex ratio increased the illegitimate birth rate during this period.  
The male scarcity also resulted in females marrying less suitable males who were 
too old or too young to serve in the Armed Forces and those who were not 
acceptable for military service due to 4F deferments.  The difference-in-difference 
analysis using micro-level census data of couples who married during 1936 to 
1950 shows significant changes in pre-war and post-war differences between 
husbands and wives in terms of their ages at marriage, educational attainment, and 
socioeconomic status. 
